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As one of the most ubiquitous condition of social life, competition is present whenever 
two or more actors aspire to reach the same singular goals (e. g. winning a game) or 
to increase their share of the same scarce resource (e.g. customers, votes, territories, 
etc.). While social psychology has accumulated considerable evidence about the be-
havior of competing individuals within small groups (e. g. Deutsch 1949; John-
son/Johnson 1989) as well as the correlates of intergroup competition (e.g. Sherif et. 
al 1954/1961) Bornstein et. al 1999), it falls into the realm of organizational sociology 
to analyze competitive relations between mesosocial voluntary associations (e. g. so-
cial movements organizations or political parties) on the one hand and corporate ac-
tors like firms, schools and hospitals (or macro-entities like nation-states and interna-
tional alliances) on the other. 
Such research efforts can easily be justified by considering how fundamentally the 
economic sector of modern societies is determined by competitive intercorporate rela-
tions, how deeply processes of political participation and regime formation are shaped 
by the competition between political parties, and how insufficiently historical develop-
ments would be understood without taking into account the rivalry between feudal 
landowners, nation-states or larger (e. g. imperial and colonial) territorial actors. 
 
Evidently, the perennial tendency to keep the scientific analysis of these different 
specimens of competition within the boundaries of highly segregated special disci-
plines (economics, political science etc.) has hitherto hampered the development of a 
more generalized theory which would be applicable to all types of collective social ac-
tors alike. 
 
On the other hand, organizational research since the 60ies has produced much em-
pirical evidence and theoretical argumentations which could contribute to such an 
ambitious endeavor.  
In particular, several studies have addressed the question how external competitive 
relations impinge on organizational behavior and intraorganizational structures and 
processes – by way of causal determination or at least by restraining the options for 
strategic choice and tactical actions. 
 
Only marginally (if at all), such studies have touched the question raised in this pre-
sent paper:  
How does the occurrence and intensity of competition relate to the level of hu-
man resources: to the composition of organizational staff and to the level (and 
kinds) of required skills? 
 
Evidently, this question has become increasingly salient recently insofar as many cur-
rent (economical as well as technological and socio-cultural) developments have the 
common effect of increasing the pace and intensity of competition faced by compa-
nies in all economic sectors. 
For instance, tariff barriers and other protective governmental regulations become 
eliminated in the course of neoliberalist policies; new firms from emerging countries 
are entering markets hitherto comfortably managed by few well-established corpora-
tions; the pace of technological innovation and product obsolescence has increased; 
and customers and business partners have become more demanding and more ready 
to articulate dissatisfactions. (Adler/Docherty 1997). During the 90ies, economic re-
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cession has contributed to a shrinkage of many markets, so that competitive intensity 
(particularly in the realm of prices) has increased.1 
Thus, many firms currently operate under conditions of “hypercompetitivity” (D’Aveni 
1994) which forces them to commit many resources to continuous environmental 
scanning and learning processes, to reconsider permanently all their structures, com-
mitments, planning schemes and operational activities, and to implement time-limited 
fast-response strategies in order to adapt to short-term unforseen developments and 
events (Hamel/Prahalad 1989; Hill 1988).  
 
In addition, it can be assumed that in comparison to previous decades, competitive 
relations have nowadays more direct repercussions on the role of individual employ-
ees, and thus on the level of required skills. For instance, downsizing has the effect 
that a larger percentage of employees have to deal with customers and other extraor-
ganizational concerns. Likewise the tendency to disaggregate monolithic enterprises 
into rather autonomous divisions or profit centers has the effect that more members 
have to adopt a commercial perspective because they have become incumbents of 
“boundary roles”. And finally, modern lean production and “total quality” philosophies 
aim at committing every employee to an “entrepreneurial spirit”: thus aspiring a condi-
tion where all activities of all members are continuously oriented at the firm’s most sa-




2. The “open system” and “contingency” perspective of 
formal organizations 
 
Since several decades, there is a general trend that economic firms have to commit 
ever more attention, energy and resources to extraorganizational concerns, because 
environmental conditions are getting more complex, volatile and unpredictable, and 
more decisive for the company’s chances of survival and growth. 
Thus, societal pressures to conform to ecological standards, nondiscriminatory prac-
tices and many other legal regulations have increased, customers and other stake-
holders are better organized and more inclined to articulate grievances or even file 
suits, and outsourcing and “just-in-time” strategies have created a more densely-knit 
web of interdependencies among different firms. And most importantly: creating val-
ues for customers and clients has become the major goal around which all business 
activities are organized, and the implementation of such customer-oriented strategies 
demands that these ideas are understood and practiced on all organizational levels 
and by every single subunit and individual employee (Adler/Docherty 1997; Horte et. 
al 1996). 
 
Given the increasing salience of all these environmental factors, firms may institution-
alize a general “market-oriented” philosophy which gives priority to external adapta-
tion at the cost of internal organizational concerns (e. g. job stability or work satisfac-
tion) (Gordon 1986; Budros 1997). 
                                                 
1 For a discussion of the relationship between market contraction and competitive intensity, see: Gi-
meno et. al. 1997). 
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Since the early sixties, organizational sociology has reacted to these developments 
(or in some way even anticipated them) by developing “open systems” models of for-
mal organizations: conceiving them as reactive and adaptive (and less frequently 
even as proactive) entities within a challenging environmental field. 
These approaches contrasted with earlier stages of organization sociology which 
were characterized by a neglect of such environmental relations. For instance, classi-
cal socio-technical systems theory was focusing almost exclusively on intraorganiza-
tional aspects, especially on the role situation of the shop floor worker, 
(Adler/Docherty 1997). Doing this, it followed the classical Marxist approach which de-
fined the worker as the major “stakeholder” of business organizations. Extraorganiza-
tional relationships were regarded solely as the prerogative or interest of manage-
ment, which was supposed to have a perspective completely different than that of or-
dinary workers (Adler/Docherty 1997). 
While such “introverted” perspectives always tended to see its objects as specimens 
of a modal single type of “bureaucratic organization” (in the tradition of Max Weber 
and Taylorist “administrative science”), these new environmentally oriented ap-
proaches have brought a major shift toward comparative analyses: by proposing a 
manifold of typologies which classify organizations according to their modes of envi-
ronmental relations (like “mechanic” vs. “organic management” (Burns/Stalker 
1961)).. . When Hickson tried to make an inventory of these taxonomic typologies as 
early as 1966, he found more than 20 highly similar variants: all of them contrasting 
“more bureaucratic” (= formalized / centralized / specific) and “less bureaucratic 
(=informal / decentralized / diffuse) kinds of organizational structures (Hickson 1966). 
Concerning the environment, all of them also stressed the same crucial dimensions: 
particularly the degree of uncertainty, variability and heterogeneity of environmental 
events and developments, or the degree to which means-end relationships of organ-
izational behavior (particularly in the production sector) were explicitly known (e. g. 
Perrow 1967).  
 
All these approaches have converged in the rather diffuse, but influential “contin-
gency” paradigm which asserts that there is not one single “best type” of formal or-
ganization, but a range of different types optimally adapted to different environmental 
configurations. 
 
The major substantive hypothesis of contingency theory can be summarized by the 
simple statement that coping with high complexity engenders higher levels of infor-
mality and decentralization. 
 
The larger the heterogeneity, variability and unpredictability of external stimuli, de-
mands and pressures that impinge on an organization, the more it has to develop a 
structure where many individuals and subunits are capable and allowed to scan the 
environment, to collect and transmit information, to react rapidly to changed circum-
stances and to participate in collectively binding corporate decisions. 
Conducting one of the earliest empirical studies to substantiate these relationships, 
Simpson and Gulley have found out that voluntary associations with multiple goals 
and adaptation problems are more likely to develop a highly decentralized internal 
structure, and to involve a large percentage of membership in its major activities. In 
addition, they tend to maintain more complex processes of intraorganizational com-
munication in order to keep up with the larger quantity of inflowing information (Simp-
son/Gulley 1962).  
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Later studies (mainly focusing on industrial enterprises) have confirmed that as envi-
ronmental changes become more manifold, less predictable and more rapid at the 
same time, it becomes increasingly important that all subunits and all individual em-
ployees in the corporation are capable and motivated for change: 
“Coping with complexity and rapid, often stochastic, change requires focus on goals, 
responsibility, and discretion throughout the entire organization, understanding of the 
company and its context and coping with the dynamics, i.e., change and learning.” 
(Adler/Docherty 1997). 
As a result. control structures become decentralized, in order to empower all employ-
ees for making decisions in accordance with their own understanding of the compa-
nies interests and goals: 
“Power shifts from the hierarchy to the control of the product by all. Power is based on 
skill, knowledge, and experience of the matter at hand. It requires putting complex 
systems into a human scale, i.e., creating an understanding of the world of work in a 
way all members of the organization can grasp. Employees accept the authority to 
make decisions related to their work as it is directed toward a shared vision of the pur-
pose of the enterprise. It is dependent on understanding where the company is going, 
why it is that way, and importance of the workers' role. (Adler/Docherty 1997). 
 
Consequently, a high basic level of intelligence and skill is necessary across all cate-
gories of workers and employees, and the need for higher educated personnel rises. 
In particular, employees have to be able to accumulate their own experiences on the 
job and to engage in autodidactic endeavors of advanced training (e. g. Industry Can-
ada 1998). 
 
Transcending this one-sided focusing on “complexity”, a major synthesis of an envi-
ronmentally oriented organization theory has been proposed by Lawrence (1981) who 
argues that all economic firms experience two types of insufficiences which engender 
highly divergent strategies of adaptations: 
 
1) Scarcity of information: 
Firms have to cope with uncertainties because they have not sufficient knowledge 
about their environment and its future developments on the one hand and about in-
ternal means-end relationships on the other. 
Such uncertainties force them to keep their resources in a highly liquid condition: so 
that they can easily adapt to unpredictable circumstances by reallocating their capital, 
by migrating to other contexts, by exchanging their personnel, by buying new technol-
ogy and by redefining internal procedures and organizational structures. In addition, 
they have to promote higher levels of functional differentiation: so that more special-
ized roles and subunits are available for expanding or redirecting the range of tasks 
and activities. 
 
2) Scarcity of resources 
Typically, firms operate under conditions of constraints concerning the availability of 
personnel, raw materials, production facilities and all other costly resources. Particu-
larly under conditions of intensive price competitivity, they have to minimize costs and 
to maximize efficiency in order to survive and maintain their markets. This usually im-
plies that existing resources are highly specified and committed: by freezing money in 
long-term equipment which has to “pay out” during its use, by hiring staff with highly 
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specialized skills that have to be updated or modified by expensive training invest-
ments every other year; and by optimizing production processes by working out routi-
nized and standardized procedures implemented for long periods of time. In short: 
they have to give priority to goals of intraorganizational optimization: thus reducing 
their potential to mobilize liquid “slack resources” when unpredicted new circum-
stances arise. 
 
As both contradictory strains are usually present, each firm has to find ways to equili-
brate efficiency and adaptation needs at the same time. 
When uncertainties are relatively low and resource constraints high, organizations are 
likely to become highly formalized and centralized “machine bureaucracies”; when 
uncertainties are considerable and resource scarcities insignificant, they will tend to-
ward loosely structured “adhocracies” of the “organic management type” (Lawrence 
1981). When both strains are very intensive, they may tend toward “simple structures” 
characterized by small, unstable organizational units; and when both are low or ab-
sent, optimal conditions exist for the unfolding of “professional bureaucracies” (typi-
cally found in subsidized public service organizations and governmental administra-
tions) (Lawrence 1981). 
Within this conceptual framework, competition can easily be characterized as an envi-
ronmental condition which is difficult to cope with because it generates substantial 
uncertainties on the one hand and resource scarcities on the other. 
 
Like many other approaches within the paradigm of “contingency theory”, the theo-
retical model Lawrence proposed was (at least implicitly) heavily indebted to the “so-
cial neodarwinist” approaches which focus on ecological and evolutionary studies of 
“commensalistic” organizational populations (e. g. Hannan/Freeman 1977; 1978; Brit-
tain/Freeman 1980).2  
 
In the meantime, several students of the topic have emphasized the shortcomings of 
such biologist views which see organizations mainly as adaptive actors vis-à-vis a 
dominant environment determining their chances of survival and growth. Instead, it 
has been stressed that while such one-sided adaptations are unquestionably frequent 
and of high importance, organizational environments can also be dependent vari-
ables: insofar as firms 
a) choose specific strategies which then lead to specific correlative environmental 
conditions (e. g. by deciding to rely on specific products, technologies or raw materi-
als or by cooperating with other firms). 
b) intentionally select specific environments (e. g. by choosing plant locations, by de-
ciding to enter certain market niches or to appeal to certain segments of customers 
etc.) 
c) shape actively their environments (e. g. by buying out dangerous competitors, 
erecting barriers of entry, exerting pressures on governmental (regulative or subsidiz-
ing) agencies etc. 
 
In fact, contingency theory has never succeeded in eradicating the basic heretic ques-
tion: Do organizations really adapt? 
 
                                                 
2 In their book publication “Organizational Ecology of 1989, Hannan % freeman have summarized the 
results of 15 years of empirical research. 
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As Baum and Singh (1996) have noted, not all organizational sociologists share the 
premise that organizations are adaptable social systems capable and motivated to 
design their structures and processes in optimal accordance with environmental 
needs. 
On the one hand, the “Lamarckian“adaptionists” try to demonstrate that organizations 
respond to external threats and opportunities by revising their internal procedures and 
structures – even if they do this intuitively or even accidentally: more by trial and error 
processes than by rational analysis and design. (e.g., Chandler 1977; Pfeffer & Sal-
ancik 1978; Rumelt 1986; Thompson 1967).  
On the other hand, the “Darwinian selectionists” assert that economic evolution pro-
ceeds by a constant replacement of unfit organizations by fitter ones. They perceive 
firms as rather inert and/or randomly moving entities more likely to be whiped out than 
to adapt successfully when environmental circumstances change to the worse. (e. g. 
Amburgey, Kelly & Barnett 1993; Hannan & Freeman 1977, 1984;1989): 
 
“....even when actors strive to cope with their environments, action may be random 
with respect to adaptation as long as the environments are highly uncertain or the 
connections between means and ends are not well understood. It is the match be-
tween action and environmental outcomes that must be random on average for selec-
tion models to apply.” (Hannan/Freeman 1989:22). 
 
Consequently, studying organizational change mainly means: focusing on the differ-
ential birth and death rates of various organizational forms (Boone & Witteloos-
tuijn1995).  
 
The two perspectives can be reconciled by making use of the empirical regularity that 
new branches often start by a selectionist phase characterized by the rapid founda-
tion and elimination of many small firms (“r-selection”), while more mature market 
niches are often occupied by rather few highly experienced players which have 
learned to survive by coping actively with environmental problems – or simply by 




Thus, in contrast to the older “contingency theory” of organizations that has given pri-
ority to the unilateral influence of the environment on intraorganizational processes 
and structures (Burns/Stalker 1961, Hambrick, 1983, 1985; Miller & Friesen, 1984) , 
newer research studies focus on more bilateral causal relationships conditioned by 
strategic organizational action. (e. g. Swamidass / Newell 1987). 
More specifically: by deciding about entering new product markets, cooperating with 
other firms, outsourcing specific tasks, migrating to other countries, changing produc-
tion technologies or modifying the skill demands of their employees, firms basically 
change their environments instead of adapting to given environmental conditions. The 
more degrees of freedom they have in making strategic choices, the more environ-
mental-structure – relationships can be reduced to insignificance (Porter 1980; Miller 
1986; 88). 
 
There is consensus that whenever we see organizations adapting to their environ-
ment, a very complicated process takes place co-determined by many intervening 
factors. (Kieser/Kubiceck 1983:355). Thus, change is not happening automatically, 
but has to be implemented intentionally by managerial decisions and implementa-
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tions. This implies that “adaptive” strategies can well be objectively disfunctional (e. g. 
when environmental problems and opportunities are not adequately perceived and in-
terpreted); that they may occur as discontinuous events, with too much delay – or 
never at all. 
 
Concerning the causal relationships between environmental and organizational 
change, it is important to notice that such change does not always take place in the 
form of explicitly decided and implemented measures of reorganization. 
 
Particularly when a firm is very small, change can happen without formal reorganiza-
tion measures because the few employees can easily adapt on an informal level: by 
changing cooperation patterns, leadership procedures and communication intensities 
according to current needs. 
The larger an organization, the less it can effectively change without implementing 
formal measures: e.g. by hiring additional employees, by subdividing or merging sub-
units, redefining role duties and competences, or by switching explicitly to new “firm 
philosophies” and strategic goals. 
Thus, it is not surprising to find that smaller companies show much lower correlations 
between any variables of intraorganizational structure and any indicators of external 
performance (Pelham & Wilson 1995).3 
 
Most often, adaptive processes cannot be realized fully, but only in a piecemeal fash-
ion, because traditional habits cannot be broken and/or management lacks the will or 
power needed for a systematic implementation (Cooper 1996; Miller & Chen 1994). 
Thus, Burgelmann (1991) argues that most organizational changes are “induced” 
processes highly compatible with existing strategies, activities and structures; while 
only few of them are “autonomous” measures apt to enlarge the firm’s domain and to 
renew its adaptive capabilities (e. g. when it initiates new production lines or enters 
new markets) (Burgelmann 1991). 
 
On a general level, reorganizational measures may be inhibited by the basic fact that 
organizations have a vital interest to be stable actors in order to be highly reliable to 
their customers and suppliers and in order to exploit fully the cost-saving qualities of 
routinized procedures (Hannan/Freeman 1989:74; Boone/Witteloostuijn 1995). 
In addition, all change involves risks because the consequences of acting differently 
are more difficult to predict than consequences of keeping activities as they are. 
(Greve 1998). 
Thus, a major precondition facilitating organizational change is the capacity and moti-
vation of a firm to tolerate risks: a variable highly dependent on subjective prefer-
ences on the one hand and objective capabilities (e. g. buffering slack resources) on 
the other (Miller & Chen 1994; Greve 1998). 
 
It has also been argued that most organizations are not able to adapt optimally to 
their environmental circumstances because they lack sufficient knowledge about their 
internal capacities and shortcomings. For instance, they are not well informed about 
the competencies of their personnel and about the potential savings which could be 
realized by rational reorganization: 
                                                 
3 This also accords with the early finding of Simpson & Gully that only larger voluntary associations 
show high correlations between the complexity of external pressures and various aspects of intraor-
ganizational structure (e. g. decentralization, membership involvement and the intensity of internal 
communication). 
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“To date, the development of tools for analyzing environmental opportunities and 
threats has proceeded much more rapidly than the development of tools for analyzing 
a firm's internal strengths and weaknesses.“ (Barney 1995). 
 
The more informal and decentralized an organization, the more it is prone to experi-
ence such handicaps because informality means that little systematic information 
about intraorganizational structures and processes can be collected, and decentrali-
zation implies that much information remains on the level of specific subsystems, so 
that top managers remain insufficiently informed. Because of such shortcomings, low 
potentials for rational environmental adaptation has been found in samples of Cana-
dian day care facilities (Baum and Singh 1996) and in Californian wineries (Delacroix 
and Swaminathan 1991). 
 
Finally, it has to be considered that any successful adaptation presupposes a certain 
pool of uncommitted “discretionary resources” which can be dedicated to the required 
new processes of decision-making, planning and implementation. While competitive 
challenges may be necessary to stimulate higher levels of performance and encom-
passing endeavors of adaptive reorganization, the constraints they generate for the 
firm should not be so heavy that organizations lose all capacities for autonomous ac-
tions. Instead, they should have the “slack” needed to conceive and try out new activi-
ties, to become temporarily absorbed by learning processes, to initiate product inno-
vations and market campaigns which can easily fail, or to survive periods of funda-
mental reorganization during which much energy is absorbed by elaborating and im-
plementing new structures and norms (Kieser/Kubicek 1983). 
Thus, Lawrence rightly argues that organizational learning and innovation processes 
will be most likely when intermediate (instead of high) levels of environmental con-





3. The impact of competition on organizational behavior 
and intraorganizational characteristics 
 
3.1. Competition as a general precondition for autoplastic adaptive 
behavior 
 
The theoretical paradigm of “contingent organization” presupposes that organizations 
are forced (or at least: positively induced) to adapt rationally to their environment be-
cause if they don’t, they would be punished by being eliminated or at least by reduced 
profits and weaker chances of further growth. 
This “social darwinist” view is based on the premise that there are heavy environ-
mental constraints which cannot be eliminated by organizational action: so that or-
ganizations have to accept them as given structural conditions which limit (or even: 
determine) their courses of action. 
Of course, this condition is best fulfilled in highly competitive environments which offer 
no opportunities for “exit” strategies” (e. g. by getting governmental subsidies or by 
becoming a monopolist player). 
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But as decades of organizational research have shown, larger companies have often 
a large variety of options for alleviating competitive pressures: e.g. by mergers, infor-
mal alliances by creating interlocking directorates, joint ventures or other arrange-
ments of interorganizational affiliation (Selznick, 1949; Thompson, 1967; Pfeffer and 
Salancik, 1978; Burt, 1983). 
 
On the other hand, organizations can escape by migrating to specialized niches 
where competition is (still) low or absent. Its has been found that small firms are often 
more disposed to fill such new niches because they are better able to adapt flexibly 
their whole internal organization (Carroll 1984; Pelham 2000). This flexibility may be 
seen as a functional substitute for their lower ability to cope actively with given market 
conditions (and even more: to their total inability to dominate existing markets). 
 
Thus, the whole following discussion does exclusively apply to firms which are not es-
caping from, but actively coping with a given competitive situation: because exit op-
tions do not exist or because they are considered as more costly or risky than remain-
ing within the existing field of competition. 
 
 
3.2. The high significance of firm-specific factors  
 
A firm’s capacity to be profitable on its product market is a result of many different 
causal factors, some of them associated with the structure of the whole industry, oth-
ers with characteristics of the “industrial district” where the firm is located; but most of 
all: with the specific firm’s capabilities and resources. (Marsden 1998). Empirical stud-
ies show that such particular factors on the level of the single organization (and its 
staff) far outweigh the influence of overall industry factors (Rumelt 1991). 
 
It has further been substantiated that from the point of view of competitiveness and 
profitability, the most precious assets a firm possesses are most often not its tangible 
resources (like land, buildings, raw materials etc.), but highly intangible extrinsic as-
sets (like customer goodwill, patents trademarks and copyrights) on the one hand and 
intangible intrinsic assets (like staff skills, management capacities and efficient forms 
of organizational cooperation) on the other (Marsden 1998). 
While many authors stress the importance of extrinsic factors (including licenses and 
joint ventures) (Hamel & Prahalad 1989), others put the emphasis on the acquisition 
of intrinsic capacities (e .g. by collective learning) (Argyris 1994; Senge 1990). 
These two views may easily be reconciliated by taking time factors into account: 
When fundamental new action capacities have to be acquired within as very short 
time, there is no alternative than “buying” such capacities on external markets; when 
more time is available, endogeneous developments (e. g. by advanced training of 
employees) may be more profitable and efficient (Marsden 1998). On the other hand, 
a heavy reliance on external factors proves unwise when the environment is very un-
stable. Thus, the increase in environmental instability and volatility which has oc-
curred in the last decades has brought a shift from external to internal assets: 
 
“....we have the claim that changes in the business environment have rendered the 
positioning approach irrelevant and that the only sound basis for sustainable competi-
tive advantage is the development and exploitation of those resources and capabili-
ties which are, or will become, the core competences of the organisation. Indeed, the 
claim is made that core competences are more critical than the external environment 
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as a basis for strategy determination, because the environment is in too much of a 
state of change to base any strategy on it.” (Marsden 1998). 
 
 
3.3. General impacts of competition on intraorganizational proc-
esses and structures 
 
While competition has always been acknowledged in economic theory as a condition 
heavily determining a firm’s behavior and performances (e. g. Weiss 1963; Bain 
1968), its impact on staff characteristics and intraorganizational structures – a genu-
inely sociological issue – has long been neglected. With the exception of two early 
publications of Arnold Rose 1955 and Simpson & Gully (both studying voluntary as-
sociations), research on the causal correlates of competition has mainly been initiated 
in the 70ies: particularly with Rushing’s comparative studies of profit and nonprofit 
hospitals (Rushing 1973;74;76) and Pfeffer & Leblebici’s study of small manufacturing 
organizations. 
 
On a most general level, it has been found that competition increases the degree to 
which organizations turn their attention toward their external environment (instead of 
focusing introvertedly on their own internal affairs). This is exemplified by the empiri-
cal study of Rushing who found that only competitive hospitals were likely to increase 
their medical personnel in accordance with rising numbers of patients (Rushing 1974). 
 
As a consequence of this shift toward environmental concerns, intraorganizational 
structures and processes are affected in at least four different ways: 
 
First, by necessitating more attention to environmental circumstances, compe-
tition induces a higher degree of organizational activation. 
As Arnold Rose has established in his early comparative study on voluntary associa-
tions, organizations which face external competition (or even opposition) mobilize 
more internal resources and maintain a higher basic level of internal communication 
(e. g. in terms of more frequent assemblies, board meetings etc) In particular, Rose 
has observed there is an increasing meeting activity on the leadership level, which 
may indicate the heightened need for speedy, flexible decisions. (Rose 1955), 
In addition, competitive associations were more likely to stabilize a high activation 
level by establishing a large number of paid full-time roles, while noncompetitive or-
ganizations were better able to rely exclusively on unpaid volunteers (Rose 1955). As 
a logical consequence, they then become more dependent on the constant inflow of 
money – which may again reinforce their need to fight fiercely for competitive success 
(e. g. for securing regular revenues by gaining and keeping a high number of paying 
members). 
 
Secondly, general needs for high adaptability increase the need for rather gen-
eralized human skills.  
High competitive intensity means that firms have to maintain high levels of “adaptabil-
ity”: so that they are permanently able to respond rapidly to unpredictable environ-
mental developments and events.knowledge and experiences, (because these may 
quickly become obsolescent in a rapidly changing environment), it raises the need for 
employees with rather high levels of generalized learning skills: so that they are ca-
pable of participating in advanced training courses (or of learning additional matters 
by themselves): 
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“Adaptability assumes a certain threshold of skills, underpinned by the habit of learn-
ing itself. When schools fail to foster the ability to learn, they defeat the possibility of 
lifelong learning. As technology and foreign competition continue to raise standards of 
performance and skill expected of Americans, those people without basic skills will 
not be able to reach even the first rung of the value ladder.” (Doyle 1990). 
 
In concrete terms, this may imply that highly competitive firms articulate higher needs 
for personnel with at least a minimal skill level (e. g. basic vocational training or ad-
vanced general education), because such people are more likely to bring along such 
generalized abilities (and motivations) for further learning. 
 
In a major recent empirical study encompassing ca 750 firms from eight European re-
gions, it has been shown that about three out of four enterprises considered a “skilled 
workforce” as the most important factor for sustaining their competitive advantage 
(Schienstock/Kautonen/Roponen 1998). This accords with Aaker (1989) who found 
that reputation for quality was rated as the most important basis for competitive ad-
vantage by the managers questioned. 
 
Likewise, a comparative industrial survey in the Finnish Tampere region has clearly 
shown that  
1) firms see the skills of their employees as the most important resource enabling 
them to compete successfully on their markets 
2) firms with higher skilled personnel were more likely to introduce process innova-
tions as well as product innovations.4  
In fact, the survey showed that particularly process innovations were extremely rare in 
firms with a low level of skills. 
 
Generally, increased global competition seems to induce firms of all size to increase 
their innovativeness (e. g, by expanding their budget in R & D). 
This implies a growing need for many different types of skills and qualifications: par-
ticularly for rather diffuse creative and entrepreneurial talents and social competen-
cies (not essentially related to educational knowledge and formal degrees): 
 
“With regard to the qualification needs we found some interesting results. For compa-
nies in the Tampere region some kind of "new thinking" associated with creativity and 
entrepreneurship is more important, while the improvement of professional skills is 
obviously seen as a less pressing problem. The need to develop the technical, inter-
national and social skills of their workforce is also stressed by companies.”5 
 
The rather informal character of these skills – as well as the increased environmental 
volatility which hampers forcasts and planning procedures - may be responsible for 
the finding that most Finnish firms rely more on “ad hoc ”training procedures than on 




                                                 
4  “Main findings from the firm survey of the Regis project. Regional Innovation Systems: Designing for 
the future”. http://www.uta.fi/laitokset/tyoelama/regis/survey.html 
5 dito. 
6 Dito. 
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Table 3.1: Percentages of firms advocating different training needs for their employees 













62% 58% 50% 43% 33% 36% 
 
This high importance of informal skills accords well with the notion that one of the 
most significant competitive assets of a firm consists in its pool of “tacit knowledge” 
which is not acquired by regular education (and thus cannot be important by recruiting 
employees with specific formal certificates and degrees).  
As a general rule, the most profitable and enduring competitive advantages of a firm 
stem from particularistic resources which cannot be copied and transferred: so that 
they are not available to other firms. This is easily seen when different bases of skills 
and knowledge are compared .  
When production processes are based completely on completely explicit scientific 
knowledge (like chemical recipes for the production of medical dugs) or on profes-
sional skills transmitted in formal schooling, firms have no stable advantages because 
exactly the same competencies can be acquired by any other firms. On the other 
hand, there are firms which can exploit “monopolistic rents” almost forever because 
they rely on implicit knowledge which remains in their “private possession” because it 
is transmitted only by means of informal socialization processes within the organiza-
tion. (Itami 1987; Ghemawat 1991). 
The gains stemming from such exclusive “invisible assets” (Itami) can far outweigh 
the handicaps stemming from the fact that fluctuations are costly and rapid expansion 
of staff may be impossible because every new employee has to engage in time-
consuming “learning-on-the job” processes and (informal socialization by peers) in or-
der to master such skills 
Some main consequences associated with Advanced Manufacturing technologies 
(AMT) seem to originate from the fact that their efficient use depends very heavily of 
such tacit knowledge: so that only a minority of all firms is able to exploit fully these 
new technological potentials:  
“.....tacit knowledge becomes crucial to implementing AMT. For example, work flows 
and system sub-routines that have evolved to accommodate fast design/engineering 
changes or product modifications are likely to be firm-specific with cross-functional 
patterns that have become ingrained over an extended period. Successful design, 
placement and flow of flexible manufacturing cells, for example, are more contingent 
on the firm-specific work flows and organizational routines than on the advanced na-
ture of the equipment. Procedures such as materials handling, coding schemes and 
the creation of component/product families in a given AMT system also represent 
highly tacit skills, because their use largely depends on the insight, heuristics and ex-
perience of the people involved.” (Lei/Hitt/Goldhar 1996). 
 
Similarly, the importance of tacit knowledge raises when organization switch from 
highly formalized bureaucratic structures to decentralized, loosely-coupled structures, 
because explicit written rules and programs have to be substituted by more informal, 
less visible norms and procedures (Lei/Hitt/Goldhar 1996). 
 
                                                 
7 Dito. 
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This salience of tacit knowledge loosens the degree to which competitive success is 
connected to higher (formal) skill levels among employees, because even individuals 
without vocational education may be able to acquire it, while highly educated employ-
ees may not grasp it because they are too much oriented toward transorganizational 
(e. g. professional) sources of knowledge and information.  
 
Third, decentralized decision making structures are needed in order to react to 
rapidly changing needs of customers and to sudden unforseen moves of sig-
nificant competing enterprises. 
 
Thus, Moores and Duncan have found that under high competition, New Zealand 
firms are more profitable when their degree of centralization is low, while centralized 
firms work more successful in less competitive contexts. (Moores and Duncan 1989). 
Similar findings have been reported by Neghandi and Reimann (1972) and by Bose 
and Jones (1974). 
As a possible explanation, it is argued that under high environmental pressures, 
highly centralized firms risk to be maldaptive, because too many tasks are delegated 
upwards to a permanently overloaded peak. Less decentralized firms may be better 
able to satisfy customers because their employees are freer to orient their activities 
toward the client’s needs. 
In fact, only decentralized organizations may be able to institutionalize many “bound-
ary roles” able to collect relevant information about their environment and to use this 
knowledge for reacting quickly to changing market conditions and their competitor's 
actions. 
On the other extreme logical extreme, monopolistic firms can easily give priority to 
concerns of internal efficiency, because their customers cannot escape when they are 
dissatisfied with the quality of the products or the level of services – a phenomenon 
well known from the world of public administration.8 In such cases, organizations do 
better to cultivate an introverted orientation: giving more priority to smooth, efficient in-
ternal functioning than to customers or other environmental sources of trouble. 
 
By aiming to combine increased adaptiveness with high levels of system integration, 
“Team Empowerment” has the double advantage of making command chains shorter 
and decision processes swifter on the one hand, without creating too much individual 
discretion and leeway on the other. 
At the same time, teams are social group contexts capable of socializing employees 
into the company’s culture and making them acquainted with highly specific skills and 
practices: so that newcomers become swiftly assimilated “on the job”: without expen-
sive measures of formal education and training. 
 
“Increased control in primary work groups over purpose, context, and system dynam-
ics increases the group members' understanding of their local business logic. This 
understanding increases their potential or capacity to contribute to organizational 
learning in the sense defined by Cole (1994), namely to identify, standardize, and dif-
fuse best practice. Their sensitivity in perception is greater and thereby their ability to 
identify best practice is heightened, both in terms of the range of situations scanned 
and the radicalness of or deviation of perceived best practice from their own estab-
lished practice.” (Adler/Docherty 1997). 
                                                 
8 See for instance Mohr 1975 who has substantiated this lack of adaptive motivation in the case of pub-
lic health agencies. 
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Also in cases where price competition prevails, teams can be media for diffusing and 
institutionalizing cost-saving strategies in the whole enterprise, so that all employees 
become more committed to the overarching goals of increasing efficiency: 
 
“The key to successful confrontational strategy and lean management lies in the exis-
tence of a committed, motivated, and managerially aware workforce. It is not sufficient 
to simply launch cost reduction programs. 
Without the right organizational context, these programs will not work. In Japanese 
firms, the workforce is usually organized into self-guided teams, or groups, and it is 
these teams that actually achieve the firms' cost reduction objectives. Consequently, 
the way in which the teams are motivated helps to determine the success of the firms' 
cost reduction programs.” (Cooper 1996). 
 
Finally, it is widely acknowledged that competition increases the need for pow-
erful mechanisms of organizational control and integration. 
When firms operate in a competitive environment, they quickly learn when their or-
ganization is insufficient: when resources are wasted, when the same work is done 
twice because of lack of internal communication, when tasks cannot be readily com-
pleted because the contributions of different subunits are not coordinated, when build-
ings or machines are suboptimally used because there is no sufficient overview and 
planning of activities; when employees produce too little because they are not suffi-
ciently equipped or supervised; when managers cannot solve urgent problems be-
cause they have not acquired the necessary knowledge and skills, when customers 
get angry because they experience inconsistencies in organizational services....... . 
All these shortcomings are costly, and they have to be minimized by means of effi-
cient management and techniques for coordination, planning and control. 
“....an organization facing a highly competitive setting cannot afford to make many 
mistakes, nor can it be substantially less efficient than its important competitors. The 
greater external pressures on an organization under conditions of competition leads 
to a demand for even more interlocking of organizational behaviors and more coordi-
nation and control within an organization.” (Pfeffer/Leblebici 1973: 270). 
 
Thus, Arnold Rose has found that competitive organizations show a higher tendency 
to formalize their structures and activities: e.g. by relying on written statutes, rules and 
protocols. Such formalization provides them with an easy access to intraorganiza-
tional information – which may be highly functional for optimizing coordination and for 
securing an efficient use of internal resources.  
Similarly, Rushing has found that hospitals in noncompetitive settings are much more 
likely to expand their activities without investing in correlative mechanisms of organ-
izational integration (e. g. by increasing the clerical component and the administrative 
ratio), while competitive clinics show a clear tendency to increase complexity and in-
tegrative components at the same pace (Rushing 1976). This also accords with the 
findings of Lawrence and Lorsch that the most successful firms are those which com-
bine high levels of systemic differentiation and integration (Lawrence and Lorsch 
1967: 53). 
These integrative needs can become so dominant that competitive organizations 
have to streamline their activities and to reduce the number of different subunits and 
roles, because the higher their internal differentiation, the higher the correlative needs 
for integration. Such endeavors then may easily override countervailing decentraliza-
tion tendencies associated with high levels of innovation, heterogeneity and change. 
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Thus, Pfeffer/Leblebici have empirically demonstrated that many relationships as-
serted by organizational “contingency theory” hold only under conditions of less inten-
sive competition (for instance the positive impact stemming from the number of pro-
ducts (and product changes) on the number of organizational subunits, on the decen-
tralization of managerial competencies and on the specification of decision making 
procedures) (Pfeffer/Leblebici 1973). 
-  
In contradiction to the propositions of Moores and Duncan (1989), this reasoning im-
plies that when competition is intensive, centralized organizations show a better per-
formance – even when they engage in highly variable production processes and face 
considerable environmental uncertainties, Of course, competitive firms too have to 
cope with such complexities, but they react to them mainly by elaborating their hierar-
chy, not by decentralization: 
“The tall structure, with its increased review and control of decision making, it utilized 
when change or heterogeneity is confronted by an organization in a competitive envi-
ronment. Conversely, horizontal differentiation, or departmentalization, is employed 
when the organization is in a less competitive environment.” (Pfeffer/Leblebici 1973) 
 
 
3.4 Price competition and quality competition: two highly divergent 
challenges with contradictory organizational implications. 
 
As consumers always want “the best offer for the lowest price”, firms have a certain 
leeway to which extent they compete by lowering prices or by raising the “quality” of 
their products or services. (Veliyath /Fitzgerald 2000). While in most cases, a mixed 
strategy will prevail, price competition certainly dominates when products cannot be 
differentiated qualitatively (e. g. in the case of gasoline or standardized silicon chips 
(Marsden 1998)); and quality competition is stressed when prices are not flexible (e. 
g. because of interfirm cartellization or governmental regulations). 
 
Generally, it is difficult to cope with intensive price competition and high quality com-
petition at the same time, because these two conditions demand highly divergent 
measures of adaptation. Thus, price competition often forces firms to downsize in or-
der to reduce costs at the short-term; but because dismissals most often lead to less 
personnel in the R & D sector, the firm’s capacities to innovate are weakened and its 
chances for longer-term perspectives of survival and growth may be reduced (Bruton / 
Keels / Shook 1996). In other cases, high price competition induces firms to substitute 
higher-paid skilled personnel by cheaper unskilled employees: thus reducing their 
general capacities to deliver high-quality products and to implement strategies of 
quality improvement. (Budros 1997). 
 
Leaving aside such exogenous contingencies, it can generalized that price 
competition and quality competition are correlates of two diametrically op-
posed market structures. 
 
a) Price competition dominates in “stable markets”: characterized by “mature”, 
basically invariant products and consolidated, steady consumer demands. 
 
As the products- as the technologies used for fabrication - remain basically the same, 
market rivalry of suppliers focuses on price competition. Thus, survival and market 
shares become highly dependent on rationalizing processes and minimizing costs. 
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Vice versa, high price competition imposes a need to focus on a small range of highly 
standardized mass products, on highly institutionalized production procedures and on 
consolidated, “mature” market conditions: so that all organizational processes can be 
streamlined in a cost-minimizing way (Hambrick 1983; Ward / Bickford / Leong 1996).  
Insofar as price competitors are innovative, they will focus on process rather than 
product innovations (Porter 1980; Miller 1986). 
Environmental stability is most important when the costs of expensive capital invest-
ments have to be regained.  
 
“A cost leadership strategy works best under conditions of environmental stability in 
which neither customers nor competitors substantively alter their aggregate behavior. 
Such environmental stability serves to ameliorate the risk associated with large fixed 
investments in process and plant needed to sustain low unit costs with mature prod-
ucts.” (Ward / Bickford/ Leong 1996) 
 
As a consequence, successful price competitors are likely to maintain rather bureauc-
ratized structures characterized by extensive formalization and centralized decision 
making procedures: 
 
“The characteristic organizational structure of cost leaders is a highly centralized ma-
chine bureaucracy, with a key role played by the technical specialists who design the 
manufacturing and logistic systems. Important structural decisions regarding capacity 
and technology are made centrally. Relatively few substantive decisions are made by 
lower or middle management, who are charged with following plans, maintaining the 
large investment in plant and equipment and running facilities to take full advantage of 
scale economies.” (Ward / Bickford / Leong 1996). 
 
Given their high needs for intraorganizational stability, price competitors are more 
likely to search new market outlets for given production lines than to change proce-
dures in order to keep existing markets (Ward / Bickford / Leong 1996). 
 
b) Quality competition reigns in dynamic environments in innovative and un-
consolidated markets 
At the other extreme, there are highly volatile markets characterized by new products 
rapidly changing because of technological innovations on the one hand and con-
stantly shifting market conditions and consumer preferences on the other. 
Under these conditions, competition focuses on optimizing product quality as well as 
the quality of customer services: goals which demand continuous efforts in environ-
mental scanning, knowledge acquirement and technological innovation 
“If management regards the environment as stable or static, attention will be highly 
focused on rationalization, productivity, and profitability. Within the automobile indus-
try, this strategy is often referred to as ‘Fordism.’ If management regards the envi-
ronment as characterized by change and turbulence, it will give high priority to com-
petence development and the abilities to adjust, develop, and innovate. Within the 
automobile industry this strategy is often referred to as ‘Toyotism.’ (Adler/Docherty 
1997). 
 
Given two firms facing the same current market conditions, they can nevertheless fol-
low divergent strategies according to their horizons of time. 
The short-term oriented firm A will prefer price competition for optimizing its sales in 
the face of current competitors and for maximizing this year’s profit; while firm B will 
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prefer product development and innovation in order to conquer additional markets 
and/or to remain competitive in the middle- and longer-term future (Howard 1990). 
 
 
3.5 The highly divergent behavioral consequences of price and qual-
ity competition for the coping firms 
 
On a most general level. price competition and quality competition diverge highly in 
the degree of specificity of the adaptation problems to which they give rise. 
 
For economic enterprises of any kind, price competition may generate extreme wor-
ries, but it is always a precislely defined problem apt to evoke rationally designed cop-
ing strategies: 
 
First of all, the problem itself can easily be identified in objective measurable terms: 
there are competitors trying to produce the same product with less costs and sell it 
more cheaply. 
Secondly, there is a highly consensual, determinate way how the problem shall be 
solved: (reduction of costs). 
And thirdly, coping strategies can be rationally chosen because  
a) it is often known ex ante that certain measures are apt to reduce costs 
and/or 
b) when a measure is taken, its effect on costs and prices can quickly be assessed. 
 
When competition is about “quality” (of products or services), the situation is usually 
much more diffuse: 
First, ‘higher quality” is an imprecise multidimensional concept; its real meaning is not 
objectively defined, but depends on the perceptions and evaluation of the customers. 
(Sherman 1992; Cooper 1996; Veliyath/Fitzgerald 2000). 
Secondly, it is not very clear in which way the problem shall be solved: there are in-
numerable steps to be taken to change products and services: e.g. to shorten the de-
lays in shipping, to increase the spectrum of available variants, to lengthen the life-
time of products, to establish better support line etc etc. – and nobody can know ex-
actly how investments in these different aspects will pay out 
And third, the causal effects of the measures taken cannot be easily assessed. For 
instance, when improved products are better sold, this may be caused by a series of 
intermingled factors (e. g. because in the meantime, the brand has become more 
popular or the customer preferences have changed). 
If measurements are possible at all, unrealistically high investments in technology, or-
ganization and personnel have to be made in order to establish the necessary proce-
dures: 
 
“....increased resources are necessary to measure the quality of output or the per-
formance of agents. Sorting, grading, labeling, trade marks, warranties, licensing, 
time and motion studies and a variety of other techniques to measure the perform-
ance of agents are all, albeit costly and imperfect, devices to measure the character-
istics of goods and services and the performance of agents. Despite the existence of 
such devices the dissipation of income is evident all around us in the difficulty of 
measuring the quality of automobile repairs, in evaluating the safety characteristics of 
products and the quality of medical services, or in measuring educational output. The 
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problems of evaluating performance are even more acute in hierarchies because of 
the difficulties of achieving low cost measurement of the multiple dimensions of an 
agent's performance.” (North 1996) 
. 
 
3.6 The broadened scope of quality competition 
 
The high prevalence of quality competition is illustrated by a transnational company 
survey encompassing eight European regions, where Schienstock et. al have found 
that “high product quality” was the foremost factor to which most firms attributed their 
advantage in competing with rival enterprises (Schienstock/Kautonen/Roponen 1998).  
Similarly, Chaston and Mangles (1997) have found that the most important influences 
on performance included optimization of employee productivity, development of new 
products, investments in continuous improvements of product quality and measure-
ment of customer quality expectations.  
But the term “quality” has assumed a much broadened meaning than in the past. 
While in traditional industrial competition, the term referred almost exclusively to in-
trinsic attributes of the physical product (e. g. its durability, its precise and reliable 
functioning etc.), it now tends to encompass all stages of a firms activity: from the cri-
teria applied in the choice of raw materials and production procedures (e. g. ecologi-
cal considerations) right to the support services offered after customers have bought it 
and set it in operation. 
The raising salience of post-selling quality performance has been illustrated by the 
aforementioned comparative study which has found that about 40% of all firms de-




3.7. The New Ubiquity of Price competition 
 
When trade relations become global, price competition becomes more ubiquitous be-
cause local and regional protection break down. In particular, most firms from highly 
developed countries like Switzerland are increasingly challenged by cheaper competi-
tors from low-wage countries. 
In the past, many Swiss firms could reduce competitiveness by producing high quality 
products, because no other firms in other countries were able to reach the same lev-
els. In fact, the label “Swiss Made” was a long time sufficient to provide the reputation 
of high quality – a collective reputation from which all singular branches and compa-
nies could profit without having to generate and their own individual reputation. 
Thus, the rather high competitive success of many Swiss firms in foreign markets may 
at least partially be attributed to the “structural competitiveness” of Switzerland as an 
“industrial district”: i.- e. as a territory endowed with many advantageous traits vis-à -
vis other geographical regions.9 
 
In the last decades, more and more firms from more and more countries acquired 
such capacities, and given the lower level of wages in most world regions, many of 
them are no better disposed to keep selling prices low. 
                                                 
9 For aa discussion of tzhe “indusiral district” theory seee Sabel et. al. 1987; Pyke and Sengenberger 
1994; Schienstock et. al. 1998. 
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As a consequences, most firms have recently experienced an environmental change 
in a way that they are now forced to cope with intensive quality and price competition 
at the same time. 
This trend has also been substantiated in the Finnish Tampere region: 
“Companies in the Tampere region concentrate on high quality niche markets in the 
first place. They see quality and time of delivery as their competitive advantage. 
These niche markets, however, do not present a safe segment any longer. More 
companies from all over the world have learned to produce high quality. What is now 
needed is to produce high quality and user-friendly products at a reasonable price 
and to deliver them on time.”10 
 
In order to escape the cumulative pressures of quality and price competition, firms are 
forced to outperform competitors in other respects: by being quicker than other in in-
troducing new products or by being more flexible to react to changed customers 
needs: 
“Nowadays companies from all over the world can manufacture products of high qual-
ity at low costs, sell them for a reasonable price and deliver them within a short time 
period. Success within the global market mainly depends on the capability of compa-
nies to rapidly and continuously produce new products and services; innovativeness 




3.8 Some factors influencing a firm’s capacity to cope with intensive 
competition 
 
3.8.1 Firm size 
 
Since the time of Karl Marx, it is common wisdom that the evolution of private capital-
ism tends to produce larger enterprises, because big firms are better able to survive 
in economic competition. 
Within the Fordist paradigm of industrial organization, this relationship has primarily 
been elaborated with respect to price competition: Thus, it has been argued that for 
many different reasons; larger firms are better able to minimize costs by realizing of 
“economies of scale”: e. g. because they can exercise monopsonic power on suppli-
ers or because they are better able to make use of highly routinized mass production 
technologies (which result in an downgrading of required skills). More recently, it has 
been observed that larger firms have a similar edge in exploiting “economies of 
scope”: associated with the basic fact when producing good A, a firm may have lower 
costs of producing related goods B,C,D.. 
 
For the case of quality competition instead, contradictory theoretical argumentations 
have been proposed. On the one hand, Piore and Sable have asserted that small 
firms practicing craft-like production styles are better able to cope with the newer 
trends towards customized high-quality products, because they have more flexibility 
to adjust outputs (quantitatively and qualitatively) to such new demands (Piore/Sabel 
1984). On the other hand, it is also widely acknowledged that larger firms have higher 
capacities to develop large amounts of specialized knowledge and skills, and to main-
                                                 
10 “Main findings from the firm survey of the Regis project. Regional Innovation Systems: Designing for 
the future”. http://www.uta.fi/laitokset/tyoelama/regis/survey.html 
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tain collaborative relationships with universities or other innovation-oriented institu-
tions (Schienstock/Kautonen/Loponen 1998). 
In addition, they can engage in risky innovative endeavors with less fears because 
conventional procedures can be maintained at the same time (within other subunits of 
the same organization). 
“....larger organizations, although less likely to attempt core changes in the first place, 
are less likely to die during a core change attempt. Largeness can buffer organiza-
tions from the disruptive effects of core change by helping, for example, to maintain 
both old and new ways of doing things during the transition or to overcome short-term 
deprivations and competitive challenges that accompany the change attempt.” (Baum 
/ Singh 1996). 
 
Empirically, various studies have shown that larger companies are more likely to in-
novate, Thus,. The Finnish study in the Tampere region has shown that firms above 
200 employees are much more prone to innovate by introducing new products as well 
as new production procedures).11 
 
On the other hand, larger firms are often characterized by traditional Taylorist struc-
tures which go along with a high percentage of unskilled labour – a factor hampering 
innovativeness in many respects (Schienstock/Kautonen/Roponen 1998). Thus, it has 
been observed that while large firms cultivate develop and maintain highest expertise 
and skills in most areas, they are often not capable of exploiting it fully for their own 
purposes. Instead, many experts – frustrated by lacking opportunities to realize their 
ideas and be promoted – leave the firm in order to found new “spin-off” enterprises. 
These small new firms then are often developing and licensing innovations (which 
then might be bought back later by the larger firms) (Brittain/Freeman 1980). 
 
Additionally, several empirical studies have shown that while larger firm may be more 
capable of providing the capital and human resources necessary for improvements or 
innovations, they are often heavily handicapped by rigid internal structures and a ten-
dency to focus more on internal than on environmental matters. 
Thus, larger firms have been found to maintain a lower degree of market orientation 
and to show signs of complacency and inertia which makes them unfit for risky meas-
ures of change (March 1981; Aldrich & Auster 1986; Hitt et. Al. 1990). Their mere 
structural complexity leads to reduced capacities for information processing and 
slower speed in executing formally decided measures and plans (Galbraith 1977; Pel-
ham 2000). 
By contrast, smaller firms can be expected to react more flexible to environmental 
stimuli of any kind, because more employees occupy boundary roles12, because their 
structures are less bureaucratized, and their communication systems less compli-
cated (Katz 1970; Feigenbaum and Karnani (1991 etc.): 
 
“Small is beautiful. It is much easier for the new venture founder to attend to the myr-
iad of details in running a totally competitive business unit as long as it is still small 
with only a handful of employees. Perhaps, one of the reasons new ventures are able 
                                                 
11 Main findings from the firm survey of the Regis project. Regional Innovation Systems: Designing for 
the future” 1997. http://www.uta.fi/laitokset/tyoelama/regis/survey.html. For similar relationships in other 
European regions, see Schienstock/Kautonen/Roponen 1998). 
 
12 This is an implication of Peter Blaus axiomatic theory which states that the larger a system (of any 
kind), the smaller its periphery in relationship to its total size. (Blau 1977: 19ff). 
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to blossom early, is the fact that the very nature of their smallness permits adaptability 
and rapid response.” (Slevin / Covin 1995). 
 
Consequently, , while larger firms may draw more advantages from their institutional 
embedments and their capacity to control salient environmental factors, such advan-
tages may be more than offset by their smaller capacity to maintain intensive envi-
ronmental relations: 
 
” Although large firms can dominate commodity markets based on cost or financial 
advantages, larger industrial manufacturing concerns may be at a disadvantage, com-
pared to smaller firms, in their ability to learn from their market environment due to 
lessened contact between senior managers and customers as well as customer con-
tact personnel. This lessened level of contact can lead to internally focused opera-
tions and production/technical orientations that may fail to adjust to changing market 
conditions. This internal focus, combined with significant sunk costs and bureaucratic 
inertia, could render large firms more vulnerable to changing industry conditions be-
cause of the difficulty they have modifying strategy.” (Pelham 2000). 
 
This reasoning also implies that size is an intervening variable moderating the rela-
tionship between firm strategies and achieved performance. Thus, when a small firms 
focuses on a market-oriented strategy, it is more likely to gain significant competitive 
advantages than a bigger firm, because it is better able to adjust its whole internal or-
ganization to the external strategic needs (Pelham 2000). Thus 
“...market orientation may provide small firms with a potential competitive advantage 
over larger firms where layers of management and bureaucracy make understanding 
customers more difficult and also increases the difficulty of promoting a cohesive cus-
tomer-oriented culture.” (Pelham 2000). 
 
Many larger firms try to exploit such advantages by segmenting themselves into 
smaller divisions, thus combining the functional advantages of smallness and bigness 
at the same time: 
 
“The creation of small profit centers reduces the growth of organizational bureaucracy 
yet allows the firm to respond quickly to changes in the competitive environment. 
Firms that have adopted the confrontation strategy cannot afford either the extra costs 
of unnecessary bureaucracy or he slowing of the firm's reflexes that such a bureauc-
racy causes. By keeping the effective firm size small, empire building becomes almost 
impossible, and a firm can maintain its ability to adapt quickly to changes n competi-
tive conditions.” (Cooper 1996). 
 
Finally, it has to be considered that quality competition offers to many small firms ex-
cellent chances for survival and growth which are less available to larger enterprises. 
Many firms try to reduce competitive pressures by migrating to less contested niches. 
They typically do this by developing and producing highly specific products addressed 
to highly specified customer segments. The smaller the firm, the more probable that it 
finds such a highly specific small niche which offers a sufficiently large and stable 
base of subsistence. The bigger firms need larger markets which are less likely to be 
uncontested (or to compete simultaneously in different market niches which are 
unlikely to be all equally uncontested). 
Niche specialization means that a firm tries to exploit quasi-monopolistic rents by con-
quering a leader position within a narrowly defined field. This usually implies that it 
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commits all resources to raise the quality standard of its production and products by 
optimizing its technology and organization and by internalizing highly professional 
skills. 
 
“The niche differentiator often requires a more highly skilled workforce than others in 
its industry. This is particularly true of the niche quality differentiator, which often 
counts on production people to have the know-how to build a high quality product in 
the absence of formal process controls used in high volume settings. Although vari-
ous mechanisms are available to achieve quality, total quality management (TQM) 
programs are currently favored by a wide spectrum of firms, including niche manufac-
turers.” (Ward/Bickford/Leong 1996) 
 
 
3.8.2. Expanding or shrinking markets 
 
 For three different reasons, firms operating on expanding markets are better able to 
react rationally to competitive challenges and to implement successful adaptive 
change 
 
1) When niches contract, innovative behavior is hampered by the prospective than 
whenever it fails, the organization risks to be whiped out completely. 
On the other hand, expanding markets provide “buffers” because even when experi-
mental new procedures turn out bad, the mere market expansion makes it probable 
that the company still can still survive. Corroborating this hypothesis, Baum and Singh 
(1996) have found that competing Day care and nursery schools were more success-
ful in environmental adaptation under expansive than under contractive conditions. 
 
2) During phases of growth, organizations are usually quite free to enlarge existing 
and/or build new structures and the recruit additional personnel in strict accordance 
with their changing needs. In addition, expanding firms have also better chances to 
upgrade their skills by hiring highly qualified employees, because they can offer se-
cure jobs and promising careers (Russell 1997). And finally, their employees may be 
better motivated to engage in advanced training because given their long-term em-
ployment, they can reasonably expect that such investments will pay out. 
During periods of decline and contraction however, adaptations are hampered by fac-
tors of many sorts: e g. by ossified habits and traditions, by lacking flexibility of lead-
ership, by legal norms inhibiting the dismissal of employees, by poor opportunities to 
hire qualified personnel etc. 
Thus, Freeman and Hannan have found that expanding schools enlarge their admin-
istrative component quite in pace with their growing absolute size, while shrinking 
schools tend to keep their clerical apparatus too large (Freeman / Hannan 1975; Pfef-
fer 1978). 
 
3. Expanding markets allow for more specialization. When firms are operating on ex-
panding markets, they have better chances to survive in highly specialized niches, 
because it is more likely that such specialized niches are also submitted to growth 
(Romanelli 1989). Thus, they are better equipped to commit their resources irreversi-
bly to highly specified purposes: so that they can maximize their efficiency in a way 
compatible with very intensive price competition. 
On the other hand, they are also well able to survive when they sacrifice efficiency for 
remaining more flexible and innovative, because when markets expand, inefficiencies 
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are not punished so harshly as in shrinking environments. (Romanelli 1989). Thus, 
they have more leeway to follow very different strategies, so that they will develop 
highly divergent procedures and organizational forms (=high statistical dispersion). 
In shrinking markets, firms do better to keep their resources in a more liquid, reversi-
ble condition, because they may face the contingency of having to give up their tradi-
tional product lines altogether and to switch to completely new products (and corre-
sponding markets). But exactly this strategy may be blocked because price competi-
tion is so high that firms have to be completely committed to highly routinized, effi-
ciency-oriented procedures. 
 
Finally, it has also been observed that expansive and contracting conditions have 
highly divergent influences on the average level of skills. 
When firms have to downsize their staff because they are competing with little suc-
cess (and/or within shrinking markets), they may still be forced to upgrade the skill 
level of their labor force (either by selectively dismiss unskilled personnel or by substi-
tuting less skilled by more educated employees. 
The reason is that the total organizational activity has to be allocated to fewer heads, 
so that each average worker has to be able to cope with a larger variety of different 
tasks. Consequently it is more likely that any role also contain more complex prob-
lems which necessitate to hire workers with a higher basic level of knowledge and 
skills. In a Canadian case study conducted by Bob Russell, this increased role polyva-
lence has been found to be the major factor for higher skill demands in reorganizing 
firms (Russell 1997). 
Thus, when firms switching to lean production procedures may need higher skills, this 
may not be primarily caused by increased task complexity and higher qualifications 
demanded for functioning in “empowered teams”. Instead the more trivial reason may 
lie in the “horizontal expansion of jobs” (each comprising a larger spectrum of rather 
undemanding single tasks) (Russell 1997). 
 
Expanding markets instead provide optimal opportunities for implementing standard-
ized procedures and for buying capital-intensive mass production technologies – so 
that roles can be more specialized and taylorized and a shift toward lower skilled per-
sonnel may be observed. 
 
 
3.8.3. Age of the Organization 
 
For two reasons, it may be expected that older organizations are less likely to react 
adaptively to competition 
 
On the one hand, older organizations are more likely to have highly consolidated and 
rigidified structures, so that they are less disposed to react to any external stimuli with 
internal change and innovative procedures (Hannan, Freeman 1984; Davis & Stout 
1992). Miller argues that as organizations age, their very early success makes them 
assume more simple structural forms which may diminish their capacities for future 
adaptive change: 
 
“....a troublesome paradox exists: the sources of dangerous simplicity may underlie initial suc-
cess and, thus, may be doubly difficult to combat. Indeed, it is very hard to distinguish be-
tween the concentration and passionate dedication so necessary for success and competitive 
advantage and the simplistic fixations and extremes that lead to failure.” (Miller 1993: 119): 
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Thus, Baum and Singh have found in their comparative study of daycare facilities that 
older organizations were more likely to experience disruption when their markets 
niches changes (Baum / Singh 1996).  
 
Secondly, older organizations are less likely to succumb because they enjoy higher 
“social legitimation” (Hannan & Carroll 1992) and because they are more integrated 
into supporting institutional environments. For instance, they are more likely to enjoy a 
high public reputation, to be supported by highly loyal employees, to profit from a high 
status among customers; to be embedded in supportive elite networks, to enjoy the 
help of public agencies, to have a high standing on the labour market, and to get bank 
credits when needed. (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Mintz and Schwartz, 1985; Po-
dolny, 1993; Barnett 1997). 
As a consequence, social darwinist selection processes in economic markets don’t 
guarantee the “survival of the fittest”, because with increasing age, survivors are in-
creasingly protected from direct impacts of environmental competitive pressures. 
 
“The net result is that the strong-survivor hypothesis is self-defeating. Environmental 
selection increases competitiveness, but by increasing concentration, it triggers the 
rise of large, impervious, but increasingly impotent organizations.” Barnett 1997). 
 
Thus, many older firms tend to become overstaffed without being punished immedi-
ately for these inefficiencies., This is seen in the regularity that many of them have to 
regain their competitive capacities by downsizing when environmental competition 
pressures suddenly increase (Budros 1997). 
 
Even younger organizations may share competitive weaknesses when they are “spin 
off’s” of older firms: because they are likely to have “inherited” their mother’s short-
comings (Barnett 1997). 
 
Empirical studies indicate that the increasing survival chances associated with higher 
age accrue disproportionately to larger organization. In fact, smaller firms seem to 
suffer from a “liability of obsolescence” which leads to increasing risks of mortality 




4. Methodology and Data Sources 
 
4.1. The sample and the two Surveys 
 
The data used in the following empirical analyses stem from two surveys conducted in 
1996 and 1998 by the Economic Department of the Federal Technical University in 
Zürich (Switzerland), both of them comprising several thousand private enterprises of 
the industrial and the tertiary sector. 
The aim of the first survey (in spring 1996) was to collect information about the firm’s 
market conditions on the one hand and their innovative behavior strategies on the 
other. Based on the Federal census of economic enterprises of 1991, a sample of 
5377 businesses (stratified according to branches and size categories) was selected, 
of which 1748 firms (=32.5) have returned the filled-out questionnaire. 
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The second survey (in spring 1998) has focused on the composition of the firm’s work 
force and skill requirements and their activities in the realm of primary as well as ad-
vanced vocational education. It comprised a revised and enlarged sample constituted 
on the basis of the Swiss Federal business census of 1995. The questionnaire was 
sent to the personnel managers of 7170 enterprises, and the return rate was 30% 
(=2132 cases).  
As a consequence of the rather low return rates on the one hand and the diverging 
composition of the two survey samples on the other, only 885 companies have partici-
pated in both surveys. They constitute the final sample on which the following statisti-
cal analyses are based. Control tests indicate that the composition of this sample 
does not deviate heavily from the original stratified sample: which means that it com-
prises a rather equilibrated collection of businesses from 28 different economic 
branches – and in each of those firms of very different size (Table 4.1). 
 
Table 4.1: Frequency distribution of firms in the total sample: according to size catego-
ries and economic sectors 
 
Firm Size  
 
30 or less 30-200 201 or more Total 
Industry / Construction 233 246 79 558 
Services 183 106 38 327 
Total 216 352 118 885 
 
 
4.2 Operationalizing the intensity of competition 
 
In the first survey conducted in 1996, the informants were asked to give a judgment 
on the intensity of competition the firm currently faces on its sales markets: 
a) in there realm of prices 
b) in the realm of non-price aspects (=quality standards of products, services or tech-
nological factors). 
 
Table 4.2: Frequency distribution of firms on the two scales of “intensity of competi-
tion” (Percentages) 
 
Value on the “intensity of competition”-scale Total 
 
1 2 3 4 5  

























On both dimensions, informants had to choose a scale value ranging from 1 (very 
low) to 5 (very high). 
While all the firms were able to locate themselves on the price competition scale, forty 
of them (=4.5%) didn’t give a judgment about the degree of non-price competition. 
 
As shown in Table 4.2, the distribution of the firms is highly skewed toward higher lev-
els of competitive intensity, particularly in the realm of prices. 




4.3. On the measurement of the dependent variables 
 
In the second survey conducted in 1998, informants were asked to indicate the firm’s 
size of staff on five levels of occupational qualification: 
1) employees full academic degrees. 
2) employees with advanced vocational diplomas or certificates officially acknowl-
edged by the federal government (e. g. diplomas in accounting, engineering, market-
ing etc.) 
3) employees who have finished an ordinary vocational education (an apprenticeship 
usually taking three or four years). 
4) unskilled or semi-skilled personnel (without any formal vocational degrees). 
5) personnel enrolled in apprenticeship or other training programs 
 
In addition, they were asked whether the firm had the intention to increase, maintain 
or decrease the number of personnel in these same five categories (within the follow-
ing two years: 1988-99). 
These data are only available for a reduced sample, because various managers (par-
ticularly of larger enterprises) were not able to provide precise figures, and even more 
of them were uncertain about the firm’s future employment perspectives.  
 
When overall percentages are calculated, it is seen that almost half of all employees 
are located on the apprenticeship level, while more than 30% are unskilled and less 
than one out of six has acquired any higher educational degrees Table 4.3) 
This distribution is a characteristic outcome of the Swiss “dualistic” system of primary 
vocational education which is based on a mix between practical in-house training and 
theoretical education in external vocational institutions (Geser 1999). 
 
Table 4.3: Staff on different skill levels: current percentage figures and direction of en-






Envisaged change in the coming two 
years (% of firms) 
 
(N =)  
  expansion stagnation shrinkage  
Academic degrees 4.88 (800) 19.8 76.9 3.4 (618) 
Advanced voc. degrees 11.80 (800) 36.6 61.2 2.2 (725) 
Apprenticeship 45.54 (801) 39.2 54.7 6.1 (786) 
Unskilled 31.51 (799) 12.1 49.3 38.5 (687) 
Trainees, Apprentices 6.69 (801) 15.9 76.6 7.5 (624) 
 
In addition, the prevalence of formal advanced training was measured by asking re-
spondents  
a) whether the firm made use of internal or external programs for advanced vocational 
training; 
b) how many employees were enrolled in such courses. 
 
It was found that 71% of all firms made use of internal programs and 53% of external 
educational institutions (and 40% of both). Among all the firms which made use of any 
formal mode of advanced training, the average enrollment rate was 39%. 
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In order to grasp the level of informal on-the-job training (as an indicator of job com-
plexity) , informants were asked how much time new incumbents of operative produc-
tion roles usually needed to get fully skilled in their respective job, and whether this in-
troductory time has recently increased, decreased or remained on the same level. 
The time indicated ranged from one day to two years, with an arithmetic mean of 68.5 
and a median of 40 days. Most respondents held that this initial training period has 
recently increased (42%) or at least remained on the same level (51%). 
 
Finally, we wanted to know which skills were considered to be “essential” or at least 
“important” for average incumbents of operative roles. 
 
Table 4.4: Importance given to various skills for ordinary operative workers in the pro-
duction department (Percentages of firms) 
 
 Degree of importance  
 












General education 2 13 51 28 5 (792) 
Foreign Languages 7 14 24 40 17 (771) 
Computer skills 12 17 35 25 11 (765) 
Vocational know-
ledge and skills 26 45 23 6 1 (783) 
Longer-term work 
experience 13 43 37 7 0 (805) 
Manual dexterity 18 36 30 14 2 (771) 
Planning and or-
ganization skills 6 25 49 16 4 (808) 
Communicative 
skills 19 45 33 3 1 (826) 
Skills to cope with 
conflicts 9 36 44 9 1 815) 
Creativity, innova-
tiveness 8 31 43 17 1 (815) 
Autonomy, self-
guidance  
23 52 23 2 0 (840) 
Flexibility 26 47 25 2 0 (823) 
 
 
Evidently there are two very different categories of highly essential skills: one center-
ing on specialized vocational knowledge, and the other clustering around highly in-
formal “key qualifications” (Schlüsselqualifikationen) related to personal action capaci-
ties (flexibility and autonomy) on the one hand and to social competencies (particu-
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5. Empirical Results 
 
5.1. Prevalent patterns and antecedents of price and quality compe-
tition among Swiss firms 
 
5.1.1 Combination patterns and interrelationships between price and quality 
competition: substitution, complementarity or mutual independence? 
 
Given the highly divergent adaptation and coping strategies related to price and qual-
ity competition, it might be expected that firms are hardly able to persist in environ-
ments were both of them are on a very high level, and that for reasons of organiza-
tional consistency, they are eager to search niches where one of the two challenges 
is insignificant or absent. 
 
On the other hand, it is evident that many recent developments in the world economy 
have the effect that more and more firms have to become (or remain) highly competi-
tive simultaneously on both dimensions. For example, many export-oriented industrial 
firms face the challenge of having to offer highest quality goods and to compete 
harshly with low-price competitors (e. g. from emerging countries) at the same time, 
and current reorganization models (focusing on “lean production” or “total quality 
management”) are designed to ease incompatibilities between enhancing product 
quality and diminishing costs.  
By crossing the two frequency distributions, it becomes evident that Swiss firms 
spread so widely on the nine-cell table that no expected negative relationships can be 
seen. In fact, the correlation between price and quality competition is insignificant in 
the industrial sector (Table 5.1) and even slightly positive in the service branches 
(where almost 12% experience highest pressures from both sides) (Table 5.2). 
 
Table 5.1: Percentages of firms with different combinations of price and quality compe-




low medium high 
Total 
low 0.7 3.7 .7 4.8% 
medium 9.6 29.0 5.9 44.4% 
High 10.2 31.2 9.4 50.8% 
Total 20.5% 63.6% 15.9% 100%  
 
 Value df Sign (2-tailed)
Pearson Chi-Square 3.121 4 .538 
 
 
About 75% percent of all industrial businesses face markets where both quality and 
price competition are at least on a medium level, while less than one percent operate 
in an environment where both pressures are rather low.  
In the service sector, significantly more businesses report low competition. Most of 
them offer their service on rather narrow domestic markets where they often enjoy lo-
cal monopolies or the protection of cartel prices. 
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Table 5.2: Percentages of firms with different combinations of price and quality compe-




low medium high 
Total 
low 4.2 6.8 2.3 13.3% 
medium 10.7 28.6 7.1 46.4% 
High 5.2 23.4 11.7 40.3% 
 




 Value df Sign (2-tailed)
Pearson Chi-Square 13.384 4 .01 
 
 
5.1.2 Firm size and firm age as concomitants of competitive intensity 
 
Given that intensive price competition is mainly found in mature branches and under 
consolidated market conditions, it could be expected that highest levels are reached 
by well established older and larger firms: businesses dedicated to the traditional 
paradigm of Fordist mass production. On the other hand, maximum quality competi-
tion should be typical for recently founded firms, particularly smaller enterprises still in 
their stages of initial growth. 
 
Some of these hypotheses are well borne out by Table 5.3 which shows highest de-
grees of price competition for larger firms operating at least since 1984 and middle-
sized businesses founded 1955 or before; and highest levels of quality competition for 
the youngest firm cohort (founded after 1983) with less than 30 employees. 
 
Table 5.3: Intensity of Competition*: comparing firms of different size and age 
 




 Price competition Quality competition 
  Firm size Firm size 









-1900 (114) 3.68 4.33 4.30 3.12 3.32 3.35 
1901-30 (142) 3.80 4.28 4.44 3.20 3.30 3.52 
1931-55 (177) 3.88 4.39 4.32 3.32 3.42 3.42 
1956-71 (182) 4.11 4.14 4.61 3.41 3.55 3.08 
1972-83 (141) 4.00 4.18 4.44 3.33 3.27 2.89 
1984-96 (111) 3.74 4.00 3.40 3.59 3.27 3.20 
 
* Average values on a scale from 1 (very low competition) to 5 (maximum competition). 
 
On the other hand, it is less easy to explain why lowest price competition is prevalent 
among the oldest small firms on the one hand and among the most recent large firms 
on the other. Referring to the first of these two samples, we might follow the “social 
darwinist” hypothesis that smaller firms are unlikely to survive for long when competi-
tion is very high, because they face too many challenges which they cannot effec-
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tively master because of their scarce resources. In other words: very old small firms 
are likely to belong to a “fortunate” category of rather protected enterprises which 
have evaded competition by specializing on uncontested smaller niches (e. g. firms 
enjoying local monopolies or secure long-term supply contracts with larger firms). In 
fact, these same firms also show rather low levels of quality competition.  
 
Symmetrically, large firms of recent origin may also be likely to profit from rather un-
competitive market conditions, because otherwise, they would not have been able to 
grow as rapidly as they did. In fact, their fortunate position is additionally highlighted 
by their low values of quality competition (a condition even more pronounced among 
larger enterprises founded between 1956 and 1983). 
 
With the exception of the youngest firm cohort, the intensity of price competition in-
creases significantly with firm size among all categories of age (table 5.3). Thus, it is 
evidently not true that larger Swiss firms enjoy more competitive protections (e. g, re-
lated to their highly consolidated market reputation, their monopoly power or their 
higher degrees of institutional embedments). This result may mirror the general regu-
larity that most sizable Swiss firms have to compete internationally because their pro-
duction is to voluminous for the small domestic market. Additionally, it may also ex-
plain why size and quality competition are also positively related among older enter-
prises. Instead, new firms show the expected negative correlations typical for dynamic 
new product lines and expanding, yet unconsolidated customer markets (Table 5.4). 
 
 
Table 5.4 : Correlations between firm size and intensity of quality competition: compar-
ing older and younger firms. 
 
Period of foundation 
1930 or earlier 1931-1971 1972 or later  
Corr. Sign. Corr. Sign. Corr. Sign. 
Firm size / 
Quality competition +.13 .046 +.04 .420 -.13 .040 
(N =  ) (246) (338) (240) 
 
 
5.1.3 Is price competition affecting organizational growth or decline? 
 
Given the rather high competitiveness of Swiss firms (also on international markets), 
we don’t expect that high levels price competition generally causes them to stagnate 
or falter. Nevertheless, the assumption remains reasonable that high challenges on 
the price front may result in shrinking nominal sales: because even when constant 
volumes are marketed, they will generate less revenue when they have to be sold at 
sinking prices. 
 
As the crosstabulations of Table 5.5 show, the expected negative correlations be-
tween price competition and firm expansion are limited to the tertiary sector. Here, the 
share of expanding businesses reaches maximum (and the rate of shrinking as well 
as stagnating firms lowest) levels when price competition is weak or inexistent, while 
exactly the reverse conditions hold when intensive price pressures prevail. 
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Table 5.5: Level of price competition and development of earnings: firms in the Indus-
trial and in the Service Sector 
 
Industrial firms Service firms 
Price Competition Price Competition Development of earn-ings (1995-97) 
low medium high low medium high 
Decrease 47 25 35 20 32 43 
Stagnation 21 26 28 31 25 21 
Increase 32 49 37 49 43 37 
Total 



























Pearson Chi-Square 6.94 4 .139 12.068 4 .017 
 
 
In the industrial sector however, a slight relationship in the opposite direction can be 
seen. In particular, firms with decreasing earnings are most frequently found in mar-
kets where price competition is low, and expanding businesses are most often found 
when medium competition prevails. Thus, industrial firms seem to behave like certain 
individuals who have to be challenged by certain medium environmental pressures in 
order to be driven to high performances, while they become lazy and unproductive 
when no such pressures exist, or when pressures are so overwhelming that no re-
sources for effective coping strategies are left. 
 
This productive “stimulation effect” stemming from medium price competition levels 
becomes most pronounced in the sample of larger firms which are significantly less 
likely to shrink when middle (instead of high or low) levels price competition prevails. 
Instead, smaller enterprises are more likely to contract when price challenges are 
high and to expand when they are low (Table 5.6).  
 
Table 5.6: Level of price competition and development of earnings: smaller and larger 
firms in the industrial and in the Service Sector 
 
Small firms  
(> 30 employees) 
Large firms  
(< 200 employees) 
Price Competition Price Competition 
Development of earn-
ings (1995-97) 
low medium high low medium high 
Decrease 33 34 41 27 6 39 
Stagnation 29 32 28 9 24 18 
Increase 38 35 31 64 70 43 
Total 



























Pearson Chi-Square 3.076 4 .545 11.986 4 .017 
 
This conforms well to the hypothesis that smaller firms are less able to cope actively 
with environmental challenges because they have less “slack resources” at hand.  
 
Similar differences show up when younger and older companies are compared. While 
younger firms are most likely to expand and least likely to shrink when price competi-
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tion is medium or low, older firms develop most positively when they are exposed to 
moderate competition (Table 5.7). 
 
Again, a possible explanation may lie in the fact that older enterprises are better 
equipped to cope actively with competitive challenges – a hypothesis which can be 
based on two very different arguments: 
1) older companies have already proven that they possess significant performance 
capacities – otherwise they would not have survived such a long time. 
2) older firms are more embedded in their societal environment (e. g. by having easier 
access to bank loans or by enjoying a higher public reputation), so that they can mo-
bilize more resources (and make investments in more risky strategies) when they are 
under (not too intensive) external pressure (Hannan & Carroll 1992; Barney 1997 
etc.). 
 
Table 5.7: Level of price competition and development of earnings: Older and younger 
firms in the Industrial and in the Service Sector 
 
Older firms  
(founded before 1955) 
Younger firms  
(founded after 1971) 
Price Competition Price Competition 
Development of sales 
(1995-97) 
low medium high low medium high 
Decrease 28 22 44 23 23 34 
Stagnation 32 29 29 27 24 24 
Increase 40 48 27 50 52 44 
Total 



























Pearson Chi-Square 10.974 4 .027 3.400 4 .493 
 
 
In the preceding introductory chapter, it has been argued on theoretical grounds that 
price competition and quality competition demand highly contradictory measures for 
successful adaptation, so that at least some firms may be quite unable to expand suc-
cessfully when both of them are intensive (see 3.5) 
Thus, while price competition for itself has evidently no considerable impact on organ-
izational development, we may still argue that growth opportunities are hampered 
when high price and quality competition are simultaneously present.  
 
In fact, the percentage of unsuccessful (=shrinking firms) reaches a maximum (40%) 
when the intensities of both price and quality competition are high, and a minimum 
(18%) when both of them are low.(Table 5.8a) 
 
On the other hand, maximum percentages of expanding firms are found in niches 
where high quality competition and low price competition are combined (Table 5.8b). 
Evidently, many Swiss firms get stimulated to high performances when they are chal-
lenged to produce high-quality goods – but only when they don’t face heavy restric-
tions to minimize current costs. Symmetrically, absence of quality competition may 
work as a disincentive: making them less fit for survival and growth when they face in-
tense competition on the level of costs and prices. 
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Table 5.8a: Percentage of firms with shrinking sales (1995-97) under different combina-




low medium high 
low 18% 33% 27% 
medium 37% 24% 21% 
High 36% 35% 40% 
 
Table 5.8b: Percentage of firms with expanding sales (1995-97) under different combi-




low medium high 
low 46% 27% 54% 
medium 46% 46% 50% 




5.2. Competitive intensity and staff qualifications 
 
5.2.1 The general impact of price and quality competition on the qualificational 
composition of staff 
 
For three reasons, it is to be expected that the current as well as the envisaged com-
position of firm staff (in terms of different skill levels) covaries with the degree of price 
and quality competition to which a company has recently been exposed. 
 
First, competitive environmental relations have a direct impact on the problems and 
role duties with which many members are confronted. Thus, advanced technical quali-
fications may be needed for reaching and maintaining high quality levels of products 
and services; sophisticated social skills are indispensable for persuading customers 
who can choose among many other attractive offers; and creative management per-
formances are necessary in order to outperform competitors in timely innovations and 
marketing endeavors. 
Secondly, competitiveness has an indirect impact on staff roles by determining the 
form of organizational structures and processes a firm has to adopt in order to cope 
effectively with environmental challenges. Thus, intensive price competition may en-
gender deskilling because companies are induced to apply “Fordist” production meth-
ods relying on highly specialized and undemanding Taylorist roles. And vice versa, in-
tensive quality competition may catalyze the adoption of “lean production” and “total 
quality” methods: with the effect that almost all employees have to possess rather so-
phisticated skills. 
And thirdly, additional statistical covariances may be caused by the fact that competi-
tiveness is a correlate of a more complex pattern of interdependent forces and condi-
tions. As hypothesized above, high price competition can be a concomitant of a “ma-
ture” market structure which engenders a low need for innovations because products 
are not changing in quality or functionality anymore. And symmetrically, intensive 
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quality competition is often embedded in dynamic phases of product development and 
rapidly changing market structures which will induce high needs for sophisticated per-
sonnel even if competition is weak or inexistent.  
 
Table 5.9: Mix of staff skills and intensity of price competition: contrasting firms in the 
industrial and in the service sector 
 
Industrial sector Service sector 
Level of price competition Level of price competition 
Percentage of per-
sonnel with 
 low medium high low medium high 
Academic degrees 4.0 3.3 3.0 10.2 7.3 6.9 
Advanced diplomas 11.6 12.7 10.8 12.2 13.9 13.9 
Apprenticeship 45.7 42.7 43.1 45.3 52.4 45.7 
Unskilled 34.0 37.1 38.7 20.8 19.8 25.8 
( N = ) (91) (116) (220) (91) (85) (117) 
 
As seen in Table 5.9, industrial enterprises as well as service firms tend to have lower 
shares of academic personnel and higher percentages of unskilled employees when 
intensive price competition prevails. In both sectors, the rise of unskilled personnel 
doesn’t go along with a reduction of apprenticed employees, so that no substitution 
between these two lowest skill level seem to take place. Only in the service sector, 
however, price competition seems to engender a partial substitution of academic staff 
by employees with advanced vocational diplomas, while industrial firms reduce the 
share of both qualification levels to a similar degree. 
 
Quality competition has also highly similar impacts in both economic sectors. In al-
most perfect symmetrical opposition to price competition, it goes along with a signifi-
cant expansion on the two highest skill levels and a lower percentage of unskilled 
employees. All these effects are somewhat more pronounced in the industrial than in 
the service sector. As in the case of price competition, the demand for apprenticed 
staff seems to be unaffected by the degree of competitive environmental pressures 
(Table 5.10). 
 
Table 5.10: Mix of staff skills and intensity of quality competition: Contrasting the in-
dustrial and the service Sector 
 
Industrial sector Service sector 
Level of quality competition Level of quality competition 
Percentage of per-
sonnel with 
 low medium high low medium high 
Academic degrees 2.3 2.4 4.4 6.8 7.2 9.9 
Advanced diplomas 8.5 11.6 12.7 12.7 13.1 14.3 
Apprenticeship 44.1 43.5 43.5 45.9 47.6 48.2 
Unskilled 40.7 38.0 35.1 26.0 22.3 20.9 
( N = ) (88) (139) (188) (57) (91) (128) 
 
 
These intersector convergencies support the provisional hypothesis that causal rela-
tionships between competition and staff skill levels may be of a highly general nature, 
because they don’t seem to be moderated by product- or technology-related factors.  
Of course, much more detailed analysis on the level of specific industries and ser-
vices would be necessary to corroborate such a far-reaching conclusion – analyses 
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which cannot easily be done with the existing sample because not enough cases are 
available for the various specialized branches. 
 
 
5.2.2 The general impact of price and quality competition on envisaged changes 
in staff competition 
 
It might be hypothesized that current competitive pressures have rather limited impact 
on current staff, because the size as well as the composition of employees is mainly 
determined by conditions of the past and cannot be easily modified when factors of 
competitiveness are changing (e.g. because hiring and firing is hampered by various 
laws and informal traditional norms), Instead, present competition may well determine 
whether firms have the intention of increasing or decreasing their staff, and if they do, 
which skill levels will be predominantly affected. When they face intensive price com-
petition, cost pressures may force them to implement general downsizing strategies 
involving all staff categories, and/or to introduce more standardized production meth-
ods which allow them to substitute expensive highly educated members by cheaper 
personnel on lower levels of skill. Such deskilling may be more common in the indus-
trial than in the tertiary sector, because the production of physical goods lends itself 
better to routinized technical procedures than the production of services (particularly 
when these are offered to other businesses). 
On the other hand, quality competition will engender expansion measures on the level 
of higher wage groups, because high skills are crucial for improving and maintaining 
high quality standards, and because cost minimization is not a predominant concern. 
 
Table 5.11: Envisaged growth of labor force on different skill levels (1996-98) : con-
trasting firms with different intensity of competition (1995) (firms in the industrial sec-
tor) 
 
Intensity of price competition Intensity of quality competition Percentage of firms 
which envisage an 
expansion of staff 
with 
 
low medium high low medium high 
Academic degrees 14.1 20.5 20.1 15.8 20.9 25.0 
Advanced diplomas 33.3 41.4 38.5 28.9 42.3 43.9 
Apprenticeship 42.7 48.7 46.7 43.9 50.1 43.1 
Unskilled 11.1 14.4 16.2 17.1 14.6 17.3 
( N = ) (74) (101)) (174) (76) (119) (145) 
 
As can be seen in Table 5.11, the first of these hypothesis is not borne out for firms of 
the industrial sector, because firms coping with low price competition show no consis-
tent lower tendency to envisage a net expansion of their staff. To the contrary, price 
competing industrial businesses are more likely to expand personnel on all qualifica-
tional levels. This may indicate that they are in fact successfully competing (or that 
they intentionally expand in order to be able to save costs by realizing more econo-
mies of scale). On the other hand, at least service firms conform somewhat to the 
second hypothesis insofar as they react to high price competition by a reduced ten-
dency to increase academic personnel, and by a heightened inclination to hire addi-
tional staff on the second-lowest level of skill (Table 5.12). 
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Looking at quality competition, high intensity is associated with increased expansion 
of academic personnel in the industrial as well as the service sector, and in industry 
as well with a significant growth of employees with advanced vocational diplomas. On 
the other hand, the need for more unskilled personnel is not consistently affected 
(Tables 5.11 and 5.12). 
 
Table 5.12: Envisaged growth of labor force on different skill levels (1996-98): contrast-
ing firms with different intensity of competition (1995) (firms in the service sector). 
 
Intensity of price competition Intensity of quality competition Percentage of firms 
which envisage an 
expansion of staff 
with 
 
low medium high low medium high 
Academic degrees 26.4 22.6 17.7 15.6 21.2 25.6 
Advanced diplomas 34.3 39.0 34.5 39.0 35.9 37.5 
Apprenticeship 31.7 24.7 40.0 33.3 27.3 28.8 
Unskilled 10.0 5.4 8.6 7.0 6.1 10.0 
( N = ) (69) (71)) (85) (45) (70) (105) 
 
 
Contrary to the popular theories asserting an irreversible shift from the secondary to 
the tertiary sector, it is evident from these data that in the case of Switzerland more 
industrial than service firms have been in the course of expansion in the period 1997-
1999, particularly on the two lowest levels of skill. 
 
It might be suggested that intensive price competition inhibits the adjustment of skill 
levels to market requirements because cost-cutting pressures are so imperative that 
there is just not enough money available for hiring additional high wage employees. 
This assumption is corroborated by Table 5.13 which shows that significant positive 
correlations between quality competition and upskilling intentions only exist when the 
level of price competition is low. 
 
Table 5.13: Correlations between intensity of quality competition (1995) and the 
planned expansion of staff on different skill levels (1996-99) contrasting firms under 
different levels of price competition 
 
Price competition Quality competition /  
Percentage of firms 
which envisage an ex-
pansion of staff with 
 
high low 
Academic degrees +.06 +.19* 
Advanced diplomas +.06 +.26** 
Apprenticeship -.08 +.12 
Unskilled -.01 -.15 
( N = ) (461) (146) 
*p < .05   **p < .01 
 
 




5.2.3 Firm size as an intervening factor 
 
The theoretical expectations concerning the impact of price competition on staff skill 
levels is borne out only for smaller businesses, which tend to reduce academic em-
ployees and increase unskilled personnel when cost pressures are very high. (Table 
5.14).  
 
Table 5.14: Mix of Staff Skills and Intensity of Price Competition: contrasting smaller 
and larger firms 
 
Smaller firms  
(<30 employees) 
Larger firms  
(>200 employees) 




low medium high low medium high 
Academic degrees 8.1 5.8 4.5 2.6 6.3 4.4 
Advanced diplomas 11.8 16.2 12.8 7.8 13.2 12.2 
Apprenticeship 46.1 47.8 48.4 46.2 45.3 39.7 
Unskilled 24.1 22.7 27.5 38.1 32.1 38.9 
( N = ) (124) (103) (165) (10) (31) (50) 
 
Contrarily, larger firms show lowest shares of highly skilled staff (academicians as 
well as employees with advanced degrees) when price competition is low. But con-
sidering extremely few large firms face low levels of price competition, no secure con-
clusions from these figures can be drawn. In fact, the expected differences show 
clearly up when firms on medium and high competition levels are compared. 
 
On the other hand, the impact of quality competition is much more pronounced in lar-
ger than in smaller firms. Thus, the share of highly skilled personnel reaches ex-
tremely low levels in large enterprises exposed to low quality competition, while their 
percentage of unskilled employees is correlatively very high (Table 5.15) 
 
In smaller businesses, the skill level is generally higher regardless of environmental 
conditions, and (with the exception of academic personnel) the effects of intensive 
quality competition – while pointing in the predicted direction - are too weak to warrant 
any valid interpretations. 
 
Table 5.15: Mix of Staff Skills and Intensity of Quality Competition: contrasting smaller 
and larger firms 
 
Smaller firms  
(< 30 employees) 
Larger firms  
(>200 employees) 




low medium high low medium high 
Academic degrees 4.4 4.3 8.4 2.4 4.5 6.6 
Advanced diplomas 13.3 12.3 15.1 5.9 14.6 13.6 
Apprenticeship 47.2 46.8 47.6 38.4 43.0 43.8 
Unskilled 25.9 25.7 22.7 48.3 33.8 31.6 
( N = ) (76) (127) (164) (22) (33) (34) 
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All together, the findings support at least partially the hypothesis that larger firms have 
more leeway to adapt their human skills to environmental competitive conditions. 
When a firm is small, it still needs a certain nucleus of skilled employees for securing 
its primary functions even when product quality requirements are not very pro-
nounced, and given its small absolute size, this nucleus will easily constitute a rather 
significant percentage of the whole staff. By contrast, larger firms can make use of 
various economies of scale (e. g. because the same highly-skilled persons can easily 
serve a much larger organization), and given their larger production output, they have 




5.2.4 Organizational age as an intervening variable 
 
On the lowest skill levels, older and newer firms show no differences in the way they 
adapt to the two modes of competition. Both samples who a similar tendency to in-
crease the share of unskilled staff when intensive price competition prevails, and to 
decrease it when quality competition is dominant (Tables 5.16 and 5.17). 
This indicates that recently found firms are as well as traditional enterprises disposed 
to apply “Taylorist” methods of deskilling when they are forced (or allowed) to mini-
mize costs in the sphere of human resources. 
 
Table 5.16: Mix of Staff Skills and Intensity of Price Competition: Contrasting Older and 
Younger Firms 
 
Older firms  
(founded before 1930) 
 
Younger Firms  
(founded after 1971) 




low medium high low medium high 
Academic degrees 4.5 2.5 3.6 13.8 7.1 5.4 
Advanced diplomas 9.0 11.9 10.3 12.3 15.8 12.7 
Apprenticeship 52.7 47.0 44.7 42.5 46.6 41.8 
Unskilled 23.4 33.1 35.5 26.8 23.2 34.8 
( N = ) (22) (92) (111) (26) (112) (91) 
 
 
Table 5.17: Mix of Staff Skills and Intensity of Quality Competition: Contrasting Older 
and Younger Firms 
 
Older firms  
(founded before 1930) 
Younger Firms  
(founded after 1971) 




low medium high low medium high 
Academic degrees 2.1 3.7 4.0 4.5 6.5 11.9 
Advanced degrees 8.4 12.3 9.6 12.4 13.9 17.4 
Apprenticeship 46.9 45.4 51.2 44.6 44.4 42.7 
Unskilled 37.3 32.5 28.2 32.5 28.1 24.7 
( N = ) (54) (126) (36) (45) (130) (47) 
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On the other hand, they diverge highly in the degree to which they adapt their labor 
force on higher levels of skill. When newer firms face low price competition or high 
quality competition , they primarily expand their highest skill segments (employees 
with advanced or academic degrees), while older firms mainly increase their second-
lowest skill segment: personnel with ordinary vocational education. 
 
This finding is highly consistent with Stinchcombe’s hypothesis that under all envi-
ronmental circumstances, older firms are perpetuating structural attributes they have 
acquired “genetically at the time of their birth; and that one of these traits is a rather 
low share of highly educated staff (Stinchcombe 1965). 
Thus, we might cautiously conclude that older firms are characterized by internal iner-
tias which limit their capacity to upgrade their performances by make use of higher 
educational knowledge. Instead, they tend to shift these burdens on personnel with 
rather low vocational education . By doing this, they may well be able to offer “solid 
reliable quality” typically associated with craft-like productions,. but not well capable of 
implementing any product or process innovations which have to be considerably 
based on sophisticated R & D. 
 
 
5.2.5 Market dynamics and organizational development as intervening variables 
 
The same competitive conditions may affect organizational structures, strategies and 
processes very differently under conditions of current (or envisaged) expansion, stag-
nation or decline. 
Thus, firms operating in shrinking markets have little leeway to adapt on the level of 
personnel, because future earning perspectives are not bright enough to hire expen-
sive additional employees. Downsizing firms in particular have little opportunity to 
change their staff composition in the direction of higher skills, because dismissals 
have often to be made by other criteria than qualification (e. g. by rules of seniority). 
Under expanding conditions, firms have much more room for rational adaptation be-
cause they can decide precisely what kind of additional personnel they want to recruit; 
and they will be quite well disposed to commit themselves to highly paid employees 
(who usually have to be guaranteed long-term security of their jobs). 
 
Consequently, it is not surprising to find that the share of highly qualified personnel is 
highest under conditions where quality competition is high and price competition is 
low (Table 5.18a/b).  
 
Table 5.18a: Percentage of employees with academic degrees in firms with different 
combinations of price and quality competition: contrasting firms in expanding vs. 
shrinking markets.  
 
Firms in expanding markets Firms in shrinking markets 
Price Competition: 
Quality competition Quality competition 
 low medium high low medium high 
low 8.8 2.5 14.7 4.5 4.2 2.6 
medium 10.3 5.8 4.1 3.5 1.5 2.1 
high 1.6 8.0 5.7 1.9 2.6 5.8 
(N = ) (36) (50) (94) (86) (119) (165) 
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Table 5.18b: Impact of price and quality competition on the percentage of employees 
with academic or advanced degrees: contrasting firms in expanding and in shrinking 















Constant 21.205  2.952 .004 
Price competition -2.977 -.150 -2.041 .043 
Expanding 
Markets 
(N = 179) Quality Competition 3.456 +.189 2.584 .011 
.054 
(.007) 
Constant     7.732  2.130 .034 
Price Competition .434 +.032 .622 .554 
Shrinking 
Markets 




Under such circumstances, firms evidently are at the same time urged to upskill their 
staff (in order to secure high-level quality) and also able to adapt in this way (because 
cost pressures are rather low).. Symmetrically, lowest shares are found when inten-
sive price (and cost) pressures combine with low quality-related competition.  
In shrinking markets, firms of almost all categories hold a lower percentage of aca-
demic staff. They also minimize such expensive employees when prices are highly 
contested and quality competition not too intensive, but – diametrically opposed to 
expanding markets – they keep them also on low levels when quality competition is 
high. 
Symmetrically, low-skilled work forces as a correlate of low quality competition are 
also somewhat most frequently found in firms operating in expanding markets (Table 
5.19a and 5.19b).  
 
Table 5.19a: Percentage of unskilled employees in firms with different combinations of 
price and quality competition: comparing firms in expanding and shrinking markets. 
 
Firms in expanding markets Firms in shrinking markets Price Competi-
tion: Quality competition Quality competition 
 low medium high low medium high 
low 34.6 16.6 21.9 26.1 35.5 28.2 
medium 35.9 28.4 23.0 37.5 29.2 30.8 
high 52.3 31.1 28.8 41.6 33.8 35.3 
(N = ) (36) (50) (94) (86) (119) (165) 
 
Table 19b: Impact of price and quality competition on the percentage of unskilled em-
ployees: contrasting firms in expanding and in shrinking markets. (Linear Regression 
Models). 
 












Constant 30.448 3.351 .001 
Price competition 4.013 +.158 2.175 .031 
Expanding 
Markets 
(N = 179) 




Constant 30.975 4.390 .000 
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This can easily be explained within the framework of traditional theories of industrial 
organization. The traditional Fordist paradigm implies that when firm have to cut costs 
in order to maintain competitive prices, they do this by implementing “Taylorist” struc-
tures resulting in higher formalization, centralization and role specialization and (at 
least on subordinate levels) in a general downgrading of demanded skills. In addition, 
this view implies (at least implicitly) the assumption that markets are ever expanding, 
so that it pays out to invest in such heavy-handed strategies of reorganization (there 
are good chances that the resulting rigid structures can be maintained), and that the 
resulting large-scale mass production will be absorbed. 
 
When markets are stagnating or shrinking, these conditions are no longer fulfilled. In-
stead, high price competition may enforce lean (or “Toyotist”) production styles which 
allow to produce craft-like customized goods (demanding rather highly skilled person-
nel) on reasonable low levels of total cost. 
 
Therefore, it is to be expected that only expanding firms in expanding markets show a 
clear tendency to react to price competition with a major deskilling of their staff. This 
hypothesis is clearly borne out in Table 5.19a and 5.19b which show highest effects 
of price competition on the share of unskilled personnel when markets are in expan-
sion. Under shrinking conditions, the degree of quality competition evidently has no 
impact when price competition is low, and when it is high, the theoretically expected 
effects are visible, but rather weak. (Tables 5.19a and 5.19b) 
Overviewing all these findings, it seems safe to conclude that expanding markets pro-
vide a more propitious environment than shrinking markets for adapting the labor 
force to external competitive needs. 
In the following, this same hypothesis is additionally tested by analyzing the joint im-
pact of competition and market conditions on the expansion of staff envisaged for the 
subsequent time period (1998-00). 
While it has to be expected that firms which operate in expanding markets are more 
likely to envisage a general expansion which implies additional recruitments on all lev-
els of skill, we additionally expect that they are more responsive to their environ-
mental conditions. Again, the main reason is that expanding companies are better 
able to optimize their staff because they are basically free to hire exactly the person-
nel they need, while shrinking firms risk to get an ever more maladaptive staff mix be-
cause various rigid norms and nonfunctional selection criteria (e. g. seniority, age, 
family status) have to be observed when employees are dismissed.13  
Furthermore, we might guess that they are focusing this upsizing disproportionately 
on higher levels of skill, because market expansion in itself typically goes along with 
many complex problems (e. g. dealing with new products and customers, facing un-
predictable new competitors etc.) which require the application of sophisticated knowl-
edge and skills.  
 
As shown in Table 5.20, all these theoretical expectations are basically borne out. 
Thus, very few firms in contracting markets intend to hire additional academic staff in 
the coming years, and this reluctance does not diminish when they have to cope with 
intensive quality competition. Under expanding conditions, about a quarter of all en-
terprises plan new academic recruitments when quality competition is low, and half of 
them when it is very high. On the other hand: while staff with advanced diplomas is 
                                                 
13 Some firms even try „painless“ strategies by not replacing employees who voluntarily leave – what 
implies that downsizing results cannot be controlled and predicted at all. 
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also less often increased when markets are shrinking, a similar positive correlation 
with quality competition holds as in expanding markets. 
 
When firms in contracting markets want to grow, they are most likely to do this on the 
second-lowest skill level (employees with apprenticeship), particularly when quality 
competition is so low that no additional staff with advanced degrees is necessitated. 
Finally, it is interesting to note that intentions to supplement additional unskilled per-
sonnel are most prevalent when firms operate in expanding product markets under 
low quality competition, and that they decline sharply when quality competition is high. 
In shrinking markets, firms seeking unskilled staff are almost as infrequent as those 
seeking employees with academic degrees (Table 5.20). 
 
Table 5.20: Level of Quality Competition (1995) and expected growth of labor force on 
different skill levels (1998-00): contrasting firms in expanding and in shrinking markets 
 
Expanding markets Shrinking markets 
Level of quality competition Level of quality competition 
Percentage of firms 
which envisage an 
expansion of staff 
with low medium high low medium high 
Academic degrees 26.4 27.7 50.0 10.5 17.1 8.1 
Advanced diplomas 47.1 52.4 56.4 24.4 36.0 32.6 
Apprenticeship 41.7 44.9 37.5 41.6 41.6 33.3 
Unskilled 24.2 14.7 13.9 11.4 11.3 16.3 
( N = ) (34) (94)) (36) (67) (176) (37) 
 
To summarize, it can be concluded that “market development” has to be treated as a 
causal variable and as an intervening variable at the same time. As a causal factor, it 
offers an environment which (1) facilitates changes in skill mix on all levels, but (2) 
necessitates to concentrate new recruitments on rather high levels of skill. And as an 
intervening variable, expanding markets seem to widen the space enterprises have 
available for far-reaching adaptations on the level of human resources, while shrink-
ing markets provide constraints which reduce a firm’s capacity to deal effectively with 
high levels of quality competition. 
 
 
5.2.6 Domestic vs. international market orientation as an intervening variable 
 
While domestically oriented and exporting firms tell us that they are exposed to 
roughly similar degrees of quality competition, the factual pressures resulting from it 
may nevertheless not be the same. Thus, export-oriented businesses are much more 
likely to face the world’s most qualified and dangerous competitors existing within 
their field: challengers equipped with far higher staff skills and far superior resources 
for R & D. 
 
In fact, the findings show that the theoretically expected relationships between quality 
competition and staff skill levels are significant exclusively in the case of outspoken 
export businesses selling more than 60% of their total output abroad. While firms with 
the next lower export rates (30-60%) still show weaker (statistically not significant) 
correlations pointing in the same direction, fully domestic enterprises don’t show any 
statistical relationships at all (Table 5.21). 
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Table 5.21: Correlations between the intensity of quality competition and the percent-
age of different skill segments in the firm’s labor force: contrasting firms with different 
share of exports (Pearson Correlation Coefficients). 
 
Percentage of goods/services exported Intensity of quality competition / Per-
centage of personnel with    0 1-30% 31-60% > 60% 
Academic degrees +.05 +.11 +.22 +.23* 
Advanced diplomas +.02 -.01 +.04 +.25** 
Apprenticeship +.04 -.01 +.14 +.06 
Unskilled -.07 -.07 -.12 -.23* 
( N = ) (252) (174) (61) (112) 
 
* p < .05     ** p < .01 
 
These highly consistent results strongly corroborate the hypothesis that export orien-
tation is a necessary precondition for quality competition to have any influence on the 
composition of a firm’s human resources. 
 
 
5.2.7 Comparing successful and less successful firms 
 
In order to identify functional relationships between competition pressures and optimal 
forms of organization, it is useful to look at the more successful firms, because these 
are most likely to be adequately adapted to their current environmental challenges. In 
the case of unsuccessful businesses, on the other hand, at least one reason for fail-
ure may lay in their lack of adaptive responses on the level of human resources, 
caused by inertia, inadequate perception of needs, managerial deficiencies, or many 
other reasons. 
As our survey contains no data about cash flow, profits or other conventional meas-
ures of economic success, we have to rely on the recent development of sales as a 
near proxy. Thus, we assume that firms which have increased their turnover in recent 
years are “successful”, despite the fact that their expansion can have exogenous 
sources (e. g. a general expansion of markets in their specific branch). 
Similarly, we suppose that shrinking firms are more likely to be maladjusted, while ac-
knowledging that even optimally structured businesses may be doomed when their 
markets are in general contraction. 
For example, the rather low direct correlations between quality competition and skill 
levels may be explained by the fact that many firms do not adapt “rationally” to their 
perceived environmental conditions: either because they maintain traditional low-skill 
technologies and structures, or because they don’t find (or have not yet found) 
enough high-level employees on the labor market. 
 
If this is true, we could still find that firms failing to adapt would be “punished” by 
lesser economic success, while adaptive enterprises would be honored by increased 
opportunities to expand their sales. 
On the empirical level, this hypothesis would imply that within the subsample of highly 
successful firms, quality competition is positively related to the skill level of staff, while 
no such correlations can be found in the case of stagnating or even contracting enter-
prises. 
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In accordance with these theoretical argumentations, successful (=expanding) firms 
show by far the highest correlations between intensity of competition and staff skill 
structures: thus supporting the hypothesis that they are most responsive to their spe-
cific environmental conditions. In this general respect, thy contrast sharply with the 
shrinking businesses which show no significant correlations at all (Table 5.22). 
 
Secondly, all statistical relationships among expansive firms are corroborating our 
theoretical expectations. Thus, high price competition is associated with fewer aca-
demic staff and more unskilled personnel, while the effects of high quality competition 
are exactly reversed. 
Evidently, the impact of quality competition seems more pervasive, because it also 
encompasses stagnating businesses and personnel with academic degrees. 
 
Table 5.22: Correlations between the intensity of competition and percentage of differ-
ent skill segments in the firm’s labor force: comparing expanding and shrinking firms 
(Pearson Correlation Coefficients). 
 
Price competition Quality competition 
Development of sales (95-97) Development of sales (95-97) 
Intensity of com-
petition / Percent-
age of personnel 
with expansion stagnation shrinkage expansion stagnation shrinkage
Academic de-
grees -.13* -.10 +.08 +.21** +.06 +.10 
Advanced diplo-
mas -.05 +.04 -.04 +.14* +.21* -.01 
Apprenticeship -.07 -.03 -.01 -.03 -.05 +.03 
Unskilled +.17* +.11 +.04 -.15* -.17* +.02 
( N = ) (276) (194) (105) (265) (189) (102) 
 
* p < .05    ** p < .01 
 
Table 5.23 shows that in the case of quality competition, firm success has different 
correlates in the two economic sectors. In the case of industrial firms, the percentage 
of academic personnel seems to be a critical success factor when quality competition 
is high, while no negative effects seem to be associated with high shares of unskilled 
employees. In tertiary sector, analogous tendencies can be found, but with reversed 
weights.  
 
Table 5.23 Correlations between percentage of staff on different skill levels (1997) and 
expansion/shrinkage of firm sales (1995-97): contrasting industrial and service firms 
firms under different levels of quality competition 
 
Industrial firms Service firms 
Quality competition Quality competition 
Expansion of Sales /  
percentage of person-
nel with 
 high low high low 
Academic degrees +.25** +.09 +.13 +.06 
Advanced degrees +.17* +.08 +.16 -.16 
Apprenticeship -.06 -.04 +.04 +.09 
Unskilled -.11 -.00 -.23* +.16 
( N = ) (163) (193) (111) (128) 
 
* p <.05  ** p < .01 
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When service firms operate under tight quality competition, their success seems to 
depend much less on a large share of highest-skill, but much more on a lowered per-
centage of unskilled employees. Evidently, there are no conditions under which the 
size of middle-skilled segments is associated in any way with economic success or 
failure.  
 
On a theoretical level, it is evident that both types of competitions constitute highly dif-
ferent environmental constraints, so that firms which want to cope successfully with 
them are force to follow highly divergent – even contradictory - strategies – on the 
level of their activities as well as on the level of personnel recruitment and organiza-
tional structure. 
When intensive price competition creates an incentive to lower costs by hiring less 
skilled personnel, we may well assume that such strategies are only viable when 
lower skills are not harmful to sales because quality competition is low. And vice 
versa: when high quality competition makes it instrumental to expand employee seg-
ments with advanced and academic education, such upgradings can only be made 
when the minimization of costs is not imperative (because price competition is mod-
erate or absent). 
 
In fact, the correlation coefficients in Table 5.24 are highly compatible with these two 
argumentations. They clearly demonstrate that  
 
1) under intensive quality competition, the positive impact of academic personnel on 
firm success (measured as expansion of sales between 1995 and 97) is only signifi-
cant when price competition is low; 
2) under intensive price competition, higher shares of unskilled personnel have only a 
positive impact on business expansion when quality competition is low (Table 5.24). 
 
Table 5.24: Correlations between percentage of staff on different skill levels (1997) and 
expansion/shrinkage of firm sales (1995-97): contrasting firms under different combi-
nations of competition 
 
Price competition high  Price competition low 
Quality competition Quality competition 
Expansion of Sales /  
Percentage of person-
nel with 
 high low high low 
Academic degrees +.06 +.01 +.23** +.10 
Advanced degrees +.19* -.01 +.10 -.03 
Apprenticeship -.01 -.16* -.07 +.04 
Unskilled -.09 +.16* -.13 -.02 
( N = ) (149) (172) (148) (158) 
 
* p <.05  ** p < .01 
 
Thus, it can be concluded that at least on the level of human resources, both types of 
competition necessitate highly incompatible, mutual interfering strategies of adapta-
tion, so that when both competitions are intensive, firms are in a rather ambiguous 
situation because no skill mix exists which would maximize survival and growth. 
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5.3. The scope of advanced training 
 
While all firms try to cover their basic needs of qualification by recruiting personnel 
with the desired formal vocational education, this strategy alone will never be suffi-
cient to procure all skills needed for optimal organizational performance, 
First of all, the knowledge gained in formal vocational education is likely to be rather 
generalized, so that it does not take into account the highly particular needs of any 
concrete enterprises: needs related to their highly divergent production technologies, 
organizational characteristics, marketing strategies, customer relationships etc etc. 
This gap is especially pronounced in the case of businesses with highly idiosyncratic 
technological systems (e. g. oil refinement or energy producing plants) or highly par-
ticularistic clients (e. g. private banking). As an implication of lean production methods 
and “total quality management” (aiming at continuous improvements of all procedures 
by means of intensive intraorganizational communication), the significance of this 
firm-specific sphere of knowledge seems to increase.  
Secondly, formal vocational skills have been acquired sometimes in previous years, 
so that it is subject to obsolescence caused by technological and organizational as 
well as economic and cultural change. While firms in well-established branches and 
stable products (e. g. nourishments or textiles) may still offer roles which can be han-
dled well by even older employees, more innovative businesses need new skills not 
(yet) provided in formal vocational education. 
And finally, firms may not be able to recruit the optimum mix of skilled personnel: 
a) because strict job security standards preclude the possibility to get rid of inade-
quately qualified older employees in order to substitute them with more fitting younger 
personnel; 
b) because the needed personnel is not available on the current labor market.  
Both of these reasons have been particularly salient for many Swiss firms in the last 
years (even in times of recession), because unemployment rates have remained low 
and particularly the supply of specialized technical personnel has been continuously 
short. 
 
Given these insufficiencies, firms have to rely on additional (and partially also substi-
tutive) strategies to secure all the needed qualifications. Almost all of them will rely on 
the most informal and least costly means: letting new entrants acquire experience “on 
the job” or charging supervisors and senior collaborators with the task of giving them 
the necessary advice and instructions. 
While such informal procedures are universally applied even in highly traditional set-
tings in order to close the “gap of specificity” between generalized vocational skills 
and the highly idiosyncratic needs of the firm, they are not adequate when additional 
skills (e. g. related to new technologies or product markets) have to be produced. In 
such cases, formalized programs of advanced training become imperative: programs 
initiated and carried through either by the firm itself or by extraorganizational institu-
tions. 
 
Table 5.25 demonstrates that within our sample, more than 80 percent of all firms use 
such formalized procedures for upgrading their human resources.  
In both economic sectors, we observe that smaller firms are most likely to be com-
pletely unengaged or to commit them selves either to internal or external programs 
exclusively, while larger enterprises prefer to combine internal and external proce-
dures. 
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Table 5.25: Percentages of firms making use of internal or external programs of formal-
ized advanced training. 
 
Industrial Firms Service Firms 
Firm size Quality competition Mode of formalized  












None 29 16 2 24 14 9 
Only internal 35 38 28 25 30 27 
Only external 14 8 7 18 11 4 
Both 22 38 62 34 44 60 
 
The size factor seems more crucial in the industrial sector where 29% of all small 
firms (but only 2% of the largest) are totally unengaged on these formal levels of ad-
vanced training.. 
 
What relationships between the intensity of competition and the scope of advanced 
training have to be expected? 
First of all, it can by hypothesized that high quality competition makes it necessary to 
enlarge such involvements, because – as stated by TQM14 philosophy – reliably high 
quality standards can only be maintained when most employees possess rather high 
specific skills (including an adequate understanding of the production process as a 
whole). 
Secondly, it might be guessed that too harsh price competition may curb a firm’s ca-
pacity to provide advanced education, because such programs are costly (in terms of 
teaching expenses as well as in terms of lost working hours). 
By combining these two propositions, we may deduce that involvement in advanced 
training reaches highest levels when quality competition is intensive and price compe-
tition low, while it will be lowest when the reverse conditions hold. 
 
As shown in Table 5.26, both of these theoretical expectations are neatly borne out. 
In fact, the linear regression analysis strongly suggests that price and quality competi-
tion act as two independent countervailing causal factors.  
Following the notion of “slack resources” (as a prerequisite for advanced training) one 
step further, we could guess that such resources are particularly scarce when firms 
operate in shrinking markets where they have to expect diminishing earnings, while 
they may be sufficiently high even under intensive price competition when expanding 
markets promise rising sales. Additionally, firms with a pessimistic outlook (as well as 
their employees personally) may find commitments in advanced training less profit-
able because they judge it to be unlikely that such investments will ever have a suffi-
cient return, 
Again, these hypotheses are consistently corroborated by the percentage figures of 
Table 5.27a. As to be expected, enrollment in advanced training is generally lower 
under shrinking market conditions, and it is particularly low when such pessimistic 
perspectives coincide with a market where price competition is high and quality com-
petition medium or low.  
                                                 
14 Total Quality management 
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On the other hand, highest percentages of staff are participating when markets are 
expanding and the most fortunate competitive constellation (low price and high quality 
competition) prevails. 
 
Table 5.26a: Percentage of staff included in programs of advanced vocational training 




low medium high 
low 33% 40 43 
medium 34 33 34 
High 26 26 34 
 
Table 5.26b: Impact of price and quality competition on the percentage of staff in-
cluded in programs of advanced training (Linear Regression Models). 
  




Constant 36.183 6.487 .000
Price competition -3.197 -.11 -2.981 .003






Table 5.27a: Percentage of staff included in programs of advanced vocational training 
and degree of competition: contrasting firms in expanding an in shrinking markets. 
 
Expanding markets Shrinking markets 
Quality competition Quality competition Price competition 
low medium high low medium high 
low 34% 45 54 28 32 36 
medium 27 36 34 35 36 33 
High 37 28 36 22 27 34 
 
Table 5.27b: Impact of price and quality competition on the percentage of staff in-
cluded in programs of advanced training: contrasting firms in expanding and in shrink-
ing markets. (Linear Regression Models). 
 
  Unstand. B 
Stand. 




Constant 34.469 2.800 .006 
Price competition -4.249 -.13 -1.697 .093 
Expanding 
Markets 
(N = 179) Quality Competition 5.789 .19 2.524 .013 
.051 
(.015) 
Constant 28.375 3.730 .000 
Price Competition -1.257 -.05 -.22 .386 
Shrinking 
Markets 




Nevertheless, there is no indication that price competition effects are neutralized 
when markets are in expansion; to the contrary, they are most pronounced in these 
cases (at least when quality competition is medium or high).  
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As can be inferred from the linear regression models, market expansion seems to be 
an intervening variable amplifying the impact of both types of competition on enroll-
ment; while market shrinking seem to depress enrollment largely independent of com-
petitive circumstances (Table 5.27b). 
Apart from market development, major differences might also be expected between 
export firms and firms focusing on domestic markets: 
1) When exporting firms are exposed to high price competition, they are likely to be 
under extreme pressures to reduce costs (in order to succeed against cheap competi-
tors from low-wage countries). Thus, their resources for advanced training may be 
very restrained. 
2) When high quality competition prevails on international markets, it is likely that ex-
tremely high upgradings in performance have to be achieved in order to prevail 
against firms with much higher human resources and expenses for R&D. As a result, 
very high enrollment rates should be expected. 
 
In order to test these hypotheses, two extremely contrasting subsamples (firms with 
pure domestic markets and firms very high shares of exports (more than 60%)) are 
compared. In accordance with theoretical expectations, Tables 5.28a and 5.28b dem-
onstrate that the causal effects of both price and quality competition are higher for 
heavily exporting businesses than for purely domestic firms – while the average in-
volvement rate isolated from competitive effects is almost the same. 
 
Table 5.28a: Percentage of staff included in programs of advanced vocational training 
and degree of competition: contrasting firms selling on domestic and on international 
markets. 
 
Mainly international markets Only domestic markets 
Quality competition Quality competition Price competition 
low medium high low medium high 
low 30% 43 46 33 40 39 
medium 33 32 32 37 33 36 
High 20 26 34 27 27 35 
 
Table 5.28b: Impact of price and quality competition on the percentage of staff enrolled 
in programs advanced training: contrasting firmsselling on domestic and on interna-
tional markets (Linear Regression Models). 
 










Constant 34.425 3.943 .000 





















Thus, international markets seem to function as amplifiers: by dramatizing the differ-
ences between high price low-quality competition firms (with minimal involvement 
rates of 20%) and businesses confronted with reverse conditions which show the 
highest values of all subsamples (46%). 
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Any firm’s commitment to advanced training will not only be conditioned by environ-
mental (e. g. competitive) conditions, but as well by various intraorganization factors. 
In particular, it might be suggested that involvement rates covary positively with the 
skill level of the labor force, because higher-skilled employees are usually better able 
to acquire new knowledge: particularly in programs which heavily rely on theoretical 
materials and on self-directed learning. Very often, high educational certificates are 
not demanded because they go along with specific knowledge and competences, but 
because they indicate that a person has been (and will continue to be) motivated and 
capable of internalizing and mastering considerable packages of knowledge and/or 
because besides specific contents, generalized “learning-to learn” capabilities have 
been acquired). 
In addition, positive correlations may also result from the fact that intraorganizational 
programs for advanced training can be more encompassing when a large number of 
highly educated employees are available for teaching purposes. 
 
In accordance with these hypotheses, Table 5.29 clearly indicate that when competi-
tive intensity is controlled, enrollment figures are still positively related to the percent-
age of staff with academic or advanced vocational degrees, and negatively correlated 
with the share of unskilled employees. But it also shows that the strength of these cor-
relations is systematically related to the mode and intensity of competition. 
Evidently, correlations are more pronounced when price competition is low than when 
it is high; but less pronounced when quality competition is low (rather than high). 
The first regularity is easily explained by considering that intensive price competition 
reduces the availability of slack resources, so that capacities for advanced training 
are generally reduced (e. g. higher skilled employees are to much absorbed by regu-
lar production activities, so that they have no time for teaching). And the second find-
ing conforms well to the assumption that low quality competition reduces the need for 
advanced training, because upgrading performance is not an imperative goal. 
 
Table 5.29: Correlations between the percentage of staff involved in advanced training 
programs and the percentages of different skill levels among employees: according to 
the degree of price and quality competition. 
 
Level of  
price competition 




 high low high low 
Academic degrees +.12* +16* +.22** +.09 
Advanced degrees +.18** +.26** +.17** +.09 
Apprenticeship +.09 -.03 +.11 +.03 
No vocational skills -.20** -.27** -.26** -.20 
( N = ) (313) (169) (286) 131) 
 
* p < .05 ** p < .01 
 
Similar to recruitment practices, programs of advanced training are not automatic re-
sponses to competitive (or other environmental) circumstances, but deliberate firm 
policies which may be enacted too late or not at all, or which may even go in a coun-
teradaptive direction. 
Thus, correlations between competitive intensities and shares of involvement may 
well be diminished by all firms not behaving in such a “rational” manner. Neverthe-
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less, such maladaptive businesses may be punished by stagnating or even shrinking 
earnings, while “adaptive” enterprises may be rewarded by growth. 
 
If this argumentation is true, the expected correlation between competition and en-
rollment should turn out to be higher in the subsample of successful firms. 
For testing these proposition, correlations between competitive intensity and ad-
vanced training enrollments were calculated separately. Nevertheless, such maladap-
tive businesses may be punished by stagnating or even shrinking earnings, while 
“adaptive” enterprises may be rewarded by growth. 
 
If this argumentation is true, the expected correlation between competition and en-
rollment should turn out to be higher in the subsample of successful firms. 
For testing these proposition, correlations between competitive intensity and ad-
vanced training enrollments were calculated separately for expanding, stagnating and 
shrinking firms. 
In fact, these hypotheses are only weakly borne out by the findings in Table 5.30. 
 
Firms in the service sector are conforming insofar as expanding businesses show the 
expected positive correlation between quality competition and enrollment, while stag-
nating and shrinking firms even tend to the negative. But industrial enterprises evi-
dently not behaving in this way, and responsiveness to price competition seems gen-
erally unrelated to business success. 
 
Table 5.30: Correlations between the intensity of competition and the percentage of 
staff enrolled in programs of advanced training: expanding and shrinking firms in the 
industrial and the service sector (Pearson Correlation Coefficients). 
 
Price competition Quality competition 
Development of sales (95-97) Development of sales (95-97) 
Intensity of Competi-
tion/ 
Percentage of staff in 
advanced education 
 
expansion stagnation shrinkage expansion stagnation shrinkage
Industrial Sector -.01 +.01 -.17 +.02 +.14 +.13 
(N = ) 
 (129) (88) (100) (125) (84) (97) 
Service Sector -.12 -.13 -.01 +.24* -.15 -.08 
(N = ) 
 (103) (59) (74) (96) (59) (70) 
 
* p < .05 ** p < .01 
 
Thus, we might provisionally draw the conclusion that enlarging advanced training 
helps service enterprises to succeed when competition demands to upgrade quality 
standards, while similar advantages are not accruing to industrial producers. 
 
 
5.4 The scope of introductory training 
 
In addition to the various formal and informal qualifications internalized in antecedent 
processes of socialization and education, any job also requires highly specific role-
related skills which can only be acquired by practicing it for a certain time. Thus, routi-
nized behavioral habits are necessary in order to handle the specific tools and ma-
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chineries with maximum efficiency and reliability and a minimum of fatigue, and de-
tailed knowledge about organizational procedures and informal collaboration networks 
has to be gathered in order to solve problems effectively and in accordance with es-
tablished rules. 
Of course, the average time needed for acquring these operative skills depends on a 
multitude of different variables: with environmental conditions and technological fac-
tors as well as with cooperative arrangements within work units and cultural and 
structural characteristics of the encompassing organization.  
Thus, quite extended introductory phases are needed in organizations which provide 
a large variety of hand-taylored services to a variety of highly different customers (e. 
g. advertizing agencies or business-counselling firms) or in rather small traditional 
production settings where handicraft-like production methods are still in use.  
On the other hand, minimal initial work experience is required in common retail stores 
selling standardized consumer items or in highly “Taylorized” firms engaged in large-
batch mass production on the basis of highly specialized and simplified roles. 
 
In order to tap this most specific dimension of work skills, our managerial informants 
were asked how many days of initial work experience were needed on the average for 
filling out “typical roles on the operative level” within their firm, and whether this intro-
ductory time period has become longer or shorter within recent years. By focusing on 
roles of lower operative levels, it can be expected that the learning time indicated will 
covary mainly with the overall organizational methods applied in the production de-
partment, but much less with the conditions in more specialized functions (e. g. in 
administrative or marketing units) and on higher (e. g. professional or managerial) 
levels. 
 
Consequently, we have good reasons to speculate that  
 
1) Intensive price competition goes along with rather short introductory periods (par-
ticularly when quality competition is low, because cost-saving Taylorized production 
methods (facilitating flexible hire-and-fire policies) will prevail. 
 
2) Intensive quality competition will cause longer learning time because average op-
erative roles demand rather sophisticated skills and because firms rely on TQM-
methods which imply a sharp increase in “tacit knowledge” particular to the specific 
firm.  
 
As seen in Table 5.31, these expectations are only partially borne out. 
 
Table 5.31 Average number of working days new entrants need for becoming efficient 
and routinized workers. under various competitive conditions: contrasting industrial 
and service enterprises. 
 
Industrial sector Service Sector 
Quality Competition Quality Competition  Price competition 
low medium high low medium high 
low 96 75 57 49 44 95 
medium 51 77 107 108 68 76 
High 54 64 63 53 70 83 
 
* Summative index based on the 12 skills shown in Tables 4.4  (scale from 0 to 12). 
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In the industrial sector, two consistent regularities stand out: introductory time is evi-
dently lowest when quality competition is absent and price competition is moderate or 
high; and the positive effect of quality competition on operative role complexity is 
much higher when price competition is moderate than when it is high. On the other 
hand, rather long periods for acquiring work experience are also needed when com-
petitive pressures in both dimensions are low. This indicates that apart from competi-
tion, there may be a second basic cause for extended learning periods: traditional 
handicraft-like production methods which have best survived in rather “protected” 
businesses little affected by competitive pressures. 
  
Such traditional residuals may be less present in the service sectors where low learn-
ing requirements prevail when both modes of competition are absent. Service firms 
also show pronounced positive effects of quality competition but (diametrically op-
posed to industrial companies) only when price competition is either high or low. In 
contrast with industrial firms, they also don’t seem to “Taylorize” their roles structures 
when price competition is high. 
The effects of both quality and price competition are very much amplified when firms 
operate in expanding markets, while they almost vanish when they face stagnating or 
shrinking conditions. (Table 5.32). In particular, very simple operative roles seem to 
prevail when growing markets go along with low quality and high price competition. 
This accord well with the hypothesis that expanding markets offer best chances to in-
troduce Taylorist production methods, because large-scale mass production is possi-
ble and even highly expensive investments in complex technologies and organiza-
tional designs are likely to pay out in the near future. 
 
Table 5.32 Average number of working days new entrants need for becoming efficient 
and routinized workers under various competitive conditions: contrasting firms in ex-
panding and shrinking markets. 
 
Expanding markets Stagnating/Shrinking markets 
Quality Competition Quality Competition Price competition 
low medium high low medium high 
low 73 71 83 67 55 64 
medium 69 71 136 79 73 64 
High 37 83 99 53 64 60 
 
On the other hand, such role-simplifying strategies seem to be much hampered when 
firms operate on international markets. Under all competitive conditions, exporting 
firms report longer periods of initital role socialization than firms which sell their prod-
ucts or services exclusively on domestic markets (Table 5.33).  
 
This may at least partially be due to the fact that most exporting firms sell their ser-
vices or products to other corporations: i. e. highly qualified customers which usually 
articulate higher quality demands than typical individual consumers. 
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Table 5.33: The impact of competitive intensity on the number of working days needed 
for becoming a fully productive, efficient worker: contrasting exporting and non-
exporting firms. 
 
Exporting firms Non-exporting firms 
Quality Competition Quality Competition  Price competition 
low medium high low medium high 
low 120 67 81 46 54 64 
medium 57 81 95 98 56 83 
High 61 61 74 46 75 63 
 
Finally, it is not surprising to find that “Taylorist” reaction strategies to high-price / low 
quality competition are much more pronounced in the case of larger firms (Table 
5.34). Evidently, certain levels of large-scale production have to reached in order to 
make investments in such cost-saving methods economically feasible. In smaller 
firms, deskilling is hampered by the fact that everybody around has (at lest some-
times) also to deal with more sophisticated tasks. 
 
Table 5.34: The impact of competitive intensity on the time needed for becoming an ef-
ficient and routinized worker. (number of working days): Contrasting smaller and lar-
ger firms. 
 
small firms  
(less than 30 employees) 
large firms  
(more than 200 employees)) 
Quality Competition Quality Competition 
 
Price competition 
low medium high low medium high 
low 74 53 75 95 33 43 
medium 75 74 104 58 70 109 
High 61 68 77 33 57 88 
 
Concerning the amount of introductory training, informants were additionally asked 
whether the average time needed to become a fully productive workers has recently 
increased, decreased or remained on the same level. Given that .41% of alls busi-
nesses reported an increase (and only 6.6% a decline), the conclusion is warranted 
that within most economic settings, work roles are currently becoming more complex 
and demanding (e. g. because of measures of downsizing or lean production) while 
conventional “Taylorist” strategies of role simplification are restricted to rather few 
(mostly larger-sized) firms. 
 
In full accordance with theoretical expectations, firms which face intensive quality 
competition are most likely to have complexified their roles, particularly in cases 
where price competition is low or absent. (Table 5.35). 
Interestingly, expanding firms seem well able to adjust role demands to high quality 
competition even when price pressures are very high, while stagnating and shrinking 
businesses are only responsive when price competition is very low (Table 5.36). Seen 
from another angle, these findings may indicate that when a firm operating under high 
quality competition and price competition is still able to install more demanding work 
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Table 5.35: Percentage of firms in which the time needed for mastering operative work-
roles has recently increased: comparing industrial and service firms facing different in-
tensities of competition. 
 
Industrial Sector Service Sector 
Quality Competition Quality Competition Price competition 
low medium high low medium high 
low 42 33 61 13 39 50 
medium 31 48 44 57 33 42 
high 40 53 51 19 44 42 
 
 
Table 5.36: Percentage of firms in which the time needed for mastering operative work-
roles has recently increased: comparing expanding and nonexpanding firms facing dif-
ferent intensities of competition. 
 
Expanding firms Non-expanding firms 
Quality Competition Quality Competition Price competition 
low medium high low medium high 
low 35 53 59 19 24 55 
medium 38 48 47 43 42 42 
high 40 55 60 32 40 37 
 
 
5.5 The Impact of Competition on the importance of various skills 
 
By focusing exclusively on the formal level of vocational education, the antecedent 
empirical analysis was severely insufficient to grasp the full impact of competiveness 
on the requirements for skills. First of all, it has to be acknowledged that preferences 
for formal certificates are also (and in some cases foremost) determined by status 
considerations and/or specific occupational traditions, not by functional necessities 
associated with specific environmental conditions, work problems and organizational 
roles. And secondly, many essential work skills are “informal” in the sense that they 
can either be acquired outside formal educational settings (e. g. foreign language or 
computer skills) or not be systematically acquired at all (e. social competencies and 
character-related skills). 
 
In order to understand more fully how competition impinges on the work skill require-
ments on the level of specific roles, our managerial informants were asked to evaluate 
the importance of 26 different work skills for average employees working in their com-
pany on the operative level. (on a five-point scale from 0 (= absolutely unimportant) to 
4 (=absolutely indispensable). 
 
While knowing that competiveness may have a more direct and stronger impact on 
particular boundary roles (particularly on the managerial level), we may still hypothe-
size that pure intraorganizational functions and lower operative levels may also be af-
fected – at least insofar as they are shaped by ther organizational strategies, struc-
tures, procedures and technologies which are in turn determined by the competitive 
environmental conditions. 
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On a most general level, we may hypothesize that high price competition lowers the 
requirements and narrows the range of required skills, because it gives rise to cost-
saving (Taylorist) production strategies which are associated with rather specialized , 
routinized and undemanding roles. In particular, we expect that more generalized 
skills not immediately related to the job should get lower ratings, because the have no 
place in rigorously structured production systems where the skill demands of all work 
roles are invariant and explicitly known in advance. 
Quality competition, on the other hand, can be expected to broaden the range and 
raise the level of required skills, because sophisticated workers are needed for up-
grading quality levels of products and services and maintaining high regular standards 
during time. In particular, the new “Total Quality Management” methods imply that all 
employees on all levels are drawn into firm-wide learning processes in order to in-
crease continuously their understanding of production processes as well as their per-
sonal qualifications: a strategy which in turn presupposes that employees are skilled 
enough to acquire additional skills. 
 
As seem from Table 5.37, most of the respective correlations coefficients are disap-
pointingly low or insignificant, at least some of these expectations are borne out.  
 
Table 5.37: Correlations between intensity of competition and the importance of vari-
ous skills for ordinary operative employees: industrial and service firms and total 
sample. 
 
Industrial Firms Service firms All firms 












General education -.11* +11* -.06 +.10 -.14** +.11* 
Foreign Languages -.01 +.08 -.16* +.06 -.11* +.07* 
Computer skills -.05 +.10* -.15* +.05 -.13** +.11* 
Special vocational knowledge -.08 +.08 -.02 +.03 -.06 +.04 
Longer-term work experience -.03 +.01 +.05 +.04 -.02 -.01 
Manual dexterity -.01 -.09 +.14* +.04 +.11** -.08* 
Planning and organization skills -.07 +.04 -.07 +.10 -.10** +.06 
Communicative skills -.04 +.14* -.14* +.08 -.11** +.08* 
Skills to cope with conflicts -.02 +.07 +.01 +.14* -.02 +.10** 
Creativity, innovativeness -.09 +.07 +.02 +.08 -.05 +.09* 
Autonomy, self-guidance  -.17** -.04 -.03 +.03 -.11** -.01 
Flexibility -.08 +.03 +.03 +.17** -.04 +.11** 
(N =  ) (442) (430) (305) (296) (831) (806) 
 
* p < .05  ** p < .01 
 
Looking at the entire sample, high price competition has evidently the effect of lower-
ing the salience of rather generalized skills which are only weakly related to the spe-
cific job:(general education, foreign languages, computer skills and communicative 
skills), while these same qualifications are more required under intensive quality com-
petition. The lower demand for planning and organizing skills and for “self guidance” 
capacities underlines the assumption that intensive price competition goals along with 
Taylorist” production methods associated with highly controlled and restrictive roles. 
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“Manual dexterity” (the skill most tightly associated with concrete work behavior) is the 
only qualification boosted by such conventional socio-technical systems. 
Quality competition, the other hand, seems to raise the need for personal creativity 
and flexibility as well as for various social qualifications needed for the maintenance 
of highly communicative and team-oriented structures.  
Many of these correlations vanish or become insignificant when the total sample is 
broken down into industrial and service organizations. Thus, the negative impact of 
price competition on the need for foreign languages and computer skills (and its posi-
tive correlation with manual skills) is seen exclusively in the tertiary sector, while its 
lowering effect on general education and self-guidance seems to be restricted to in-
dustrial firms. Similarly, quality competition seems to have divergent consequences: 
increasing primarily the need for computer and communicative skills in the industrial 
sector and the demands for flexibility and conflict resolution skills in the service 
branches (where dealing with customers is the foremost operative task). 
 
Interestingly, neither the salience of special vocational knowledge nor the require-
ments for longer-term work experience are in any way affected. These two items may 
well be seen as core competencies intrinsically related to the production of goods and 
services alike: so that they maintain their foremost significance irrespective of com-
petitiveness (or other environmental factors). 
Given that the general downskilling effect associated with Taylorist production meth-
ods,, it might be expected that the total scope of required competencies is lower when 
intensive price competition prevails. On the other hand, this effect may well be weak-
ened or neutralized when firms face high quality competition at the same time, be-
cause this would force them to maintain rather high skill levels despite the pressures 
to cut labor costs. Consequently, we expect lowest skill diversity when price competi-
tion is high and quality competition rather low. 
 
For testing this hypothesis, we calculate a summative index which expresses how 
many (out of 12) competencies are considered to be “essential” or even “indispensa-
ble” for doing the average operative jobs. 
 
Conforming to our theoretical expectations, the results of Table 5.38 show that the re-
quired diversity of skills declines with increasing levels of price competition, and that 
this effect is most pronounced when quality competition is low.  
In the industrial as well as in the service sector, price-competing firms are only able to 
perfectionize cost-cutting Taylorist procedures when they don’t face countervailing 
upskilling pressures stemming from quality competition. 
Older firms (founded 1930 or before) are most likely to keep skill demands minimal 
when they operate under medium or high price competition. This indicates that they 
have realized classical principles of Taylorist organization more pervasively than 
younger firms which seem to be committed to more homogeneous higher-skill work 
forces even when cost pressures stemming from price competitiveness are rather 
high. 
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Table 5.38: The impact of competitive intensity on the average number of skills* which 
are rated to be “essential” or “indispensable” for ordinary operative employees 
  
1) Contrasting industrial and service enterprises 
 
Industrial sector Service Sector 
Quality Competition Quality Competition Price competition 
low medium high low medium high 
low 6.2 5.0 5.5 6.5 5.9 7.0 
medium 5.3 6.1 5.5 5.6 6.3 6.0 
High 4.0 5.4 5.2 4.8 5.7 6.7 
 
5) Contrasting older and younger firms 
 
Old firms  
(founded before 1930) 
New firms  
(founded after 1971) 
Quality Competition Quality Competition 
 
Price competition 
low medium high low medium high 
low 5.8 4.9 5.6 6.1 6.5 7.1 
medium 3.7 5.8 5.4 6.4 6.1 6.2 
High 3.7 5.4 5.4 5.4 6.4 5.9 
 
As expounded above (see 5.2.6), export orientation may be considered a salient in-
termediary variable which moderates the causal impacts of competitive intensity on 
the requirement for human skills.  
 
Thus, highly pronounced price as well as quality competition may create more pro-
found problems for exporting firms than for enterprises which produce for domestic 
markets, because when competitors originate from many different countries, at least 
some of them are likely to be highly superior in efficiency, innovativeness or any other 
salient trait. 
Consequently, correlation coefficients between competitiveness and skill demands 
should be higher in internationally oriented than in pure domestic firms. 
As shown in Table 5.39, this expectation is at least partially borne out.  
 
Thus, exporting firms are more likely to lower their demand for foreign language skills, 
computer knowledge planning and communicative skills, creativity and self-guidance 
capacities when they face high price competition. Instead, much less divergences are 
seen in the case of quality competition where only three out of 12 coefficients are sig-
nificant in both subsamples. 
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Table 5.39: Correlations between intensity of competition and the importance of vari-













General education -.11* +11 -.11* +.15** 
Foreign Languages -.13* +.10 -.06 +.06 
Computer skills -.12* +.11* -.08 +.11* 
Special vocational knowledge -.12* +.06 -.06 +.05 
Longer-term work experience -.08 -.02 -.03 -.04 
Manual skills +.06 -.12 +.03 -.07 
Planning and organization skills -.15** +.12* -.04 +.02 
Communicative skills -.12* +.09 -.04 +.05 
Skills to cope with conflicts -.07 +.13* +.08 +.05 
Creativity, innovativeness -.12* +.06 -.01 +.11* 
Autonomy, self-guidance  -.17** +.02 -.04 +.01 
Flexibility -.10 +.10 +.03 +.09 
(N =  ) (363) (351) (424) (409) 
 
* p < .05  ** p < .01 
 
 
Like in previous steps of our analysis, we may hypothesize that the correlative rela-
tionships between competitiveness and skill demands are weakened by those “irra-
tional” firms which do not adequately perceive what skills are necessitated for adapt-
ing most successfully to their environmental conditions. Such informational deficien-
cies may be particularly severe here because managers cannot be supposed to have 
adequate insight into the specific work roles on the operative levels – especially in lar-
ger enterprises where they are physically and structurally quite removed from the sub-
units where the daily production of goods or services takes place. 
Following these considerations, we can deduce that higher correlations would prevail 
in the subsample of more successful (=expanding) firms, because their market suc-
cess may at least partially be conditioned by the fact that required job skills have been 
adequately perceived. 
 
In fact, this hypothesis is neatly corroborated in Table 5.40, at least for the case of 
price competition. 
 
Thus, successful firms are much more likely to adjust their skill requirements to com-
petitive relations: reducing their needs for a broad range of generalized skills on the 
one hand and raising it for manual dexterity on the other. Nonexpanding firms, on the 
other hand, show almost no reaction to price competitiveness, except by downgrading 
the importance of “general education”. 
 
Concerning the impact of quality competition, no definite conclusions seem war-
ranted: except by noting that successful firms are somewhat more prone to upgrade 
the salience of foreign language, organizational skills and flexibility, while stagnating 
or shrinking companies rely more on creativity and general education. 
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Table 5.40: Correlations between intensity of competition and the importance of vari-














General education -.20** +08 -.11* +.15** 
Foreign Languages -.18** +.14* -.06 +.06 
Computer skills -.17** +.12 -.08 +.11* 
Special vocational knowledge -.10 +.04 -.06 +.05 
Longer-term work experience -.19** +.17** -.03 -.04 
Manual skills +.21** -.12 +.03 -.07 
Planning and organization skills -.20** +.17** -.04 +.02 
Communicative skills -.12* +.10 -.04 +.05 
Skills to cope with conflicts -.19** +.07 +.08 +.05 
Creativity, innovativeness -.07 +.10 -.01 +.11* 
Autonomy, self-guidance  -.17** +.04 -.04 +.01 
Flexibility -.11 +.14* +.03 +.09 
(N =  ) (285) (275) (445) (436) 
 
* p < .05 ** p < .01 
 
Thus, we might cautiously conclude that deskilling “Taylorist” rationalization strategies 
are (still) a highly functional for business success when price competitiveness is very 
pronounced, while “upskilling” strategies (e.g. associated with lean production meth-
ods) may prove not quite as functional when high quality standards have to be 





Based on a contingency model of organizations which stresses the causal interrela-
tionships between environmental constraints and intraorganizational structures, this 
paper has tried to corroborate the hypothesis that the degree of competition to which 
a firm is exposed in its sales markets has heavy impacts on its demand for staff skills 
and its disposition to upgrade such skills by advanced training. 
Contrary to most previous studies which have treated “competition” as a one-
dimensional concept, we have found good theoretical reasons to make an analytical 
distinction between the degree of price-related and quality-related competition, be-
cause they give rise to highly divergent problems and are likely to evoke quite con-
trary strategies of procedural and structural adaptations. 
 
These hypotheses were clearly borne out by the empirical findings which showed that 
price and quality competition 
- are two distinct environmental conditions with seemingly quite different antecedents, 
because they are only weakly correlated with each other; 
- have highly contradictory effects on the dependent variables: so that almost zero 
overall effects are found when the two dimensions are not kept separated. 
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- display impacts which are highly differently mediated by a number of moderating 
variables (such as age or size of the form). 
 
Evidently, intensive price competition is the correlate of a cost-minimizing “Taylorist” 
strategy which is most prevalent in the segment of older and larger firms. Businesses 
of this sort rely heavily on unskilled employees, while showing little inclination to in-
crease academic staff or to upgrade qualifications by advanced training. 
By contrast, intensive quality competition is most often found among younger and 
smaller enterprises: firms which then feel the need to make heavy investments in 
highly-skilled employees. 
With increasing age, the firm’s sensitivity toward both competitive impacts seem to 
decline. Because of internal inertias or external “legitimation factors” which shield 
them from environmental impacts, they especially tend to maintain low percentages of 
academic personnel irrespective of their situational conditions. 
 
There is an asymmetry in the causal status of both dimensions: in the sense that price 
competition acts as an overriding condition. Whenever it is high, firms seem to be-
come insensitive to quality competition, because they may lack the “discretionary re-
sources” needed for upgrading their skills. 
 
For similar reasons, responses to quality competition are much more pronounced 
when firms operate in expanding (rather than shrinking) markets, and when they are 
themselves in a process of growth (rather than stasis or decline).  
Firms operating in international markets also show increased sensitivities. Evidently, 
they are likely to be exposed to particularly challenging competitors on the price front 
as well as in the field of quality standards, so that they may face extinction when they 
are not ready (or not capable) to adapt. 
 
While all firms certainly have the choice of adapting in the ways described or they 
may get punished when they don’t. This conclusion is at least in accordance with the 
finding that successful (=expanding) businesses show higher correlations between 
competition and staff composition than unsuccessful (=stagnating or shrinking) firms. 
 
Given the cross-sectional design of the empirical analysis, it is evident that no secure 
conclusions about the prevailing directions of causalities can be drawn. 
While the time lag between the measurement of the explanans (1996) and the ex-
plananda (1998) is conforms with the older contingency paradigm which sees organi-
zations as systems affected by given environmental conditions, there is still the possi-
bilities that the correlations found can at least partially be explained the other way 
round: e. g. by the regularity that organizations are more likely to expose themselves 
to certain competitive market conditions when they possess a certain skill composition 
within their staff, or when they are characterized by a “learning culture” which encour-
ages advanced training. 
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